The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the USA, EU and Switzerland: with a special focus on FRAND by Rizvi, Salim








The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the USA, EU and Switzerland: with a
special focus on FRAND
Rizvi, Salim





Rizvi, Salim (2010). The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the USA, EU and Switzerland: with a special






The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the USA, EC and 
Switzerland 












lic. iur. Salim Rizvi, 
Research Assistant at the University of Zurich 
 
 
Zurich, 15 May 2010 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine                                                                                                       Salim Rizvi   





“It [the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine] is 
less a doctrine than an epithet, indicating 
some exception to the right to keep one's 
creations to oneself, but not telling us what 
those exceptions are.” 
 
Phillip Areeda 
(in: Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of 
Limiting Principles, Antitrust Law Journal 58, 
1989, p. 841) 
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Part A.  The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine 
I. Introduction 
1. The Essential-Facility-Doctrine – what’s the issue? 
a. An example 
Imaging a public company A, which ownes and operates a port. The company also 
operates the only ferry service between the port and the port across the lake. Another 
ferry company B, intends to exploit the same sailing route as the company which 
ownes the port. It is however hindered by the port owner, a public corporation, by 
charging excessive payments for using the port and not allowing to build a new port 
next to theirs.1 These facts make it impossible for the company B to compete with 
company A (Case of Port of Rødby)2. The Commission defined an essential facility 
as a facility or infrastructure without which the owner‘s competitors are unable to 
offer their services to customers.3 
However, there are also situations which are not that clear: 
 Imagine the following Situation4: Company A operates skiing facilities at 
three of four skiing mountains in Aspen: Ajax Mountain, Buttermilk and Snowmass. 
Company B operates skiing facilities at the fourth mountain, Aspen Highlands. 
For many years, the two parties, company A and B, individually offered a 
wide variety of ski-lift tickets. The ski-lift tickets of Company A were interchangea-
ble among its three Aspen facilities. From the 1962-63 ski-season through the 1971-
72 season, the two parties offered a joint multi-day ski-lift ticket which could be 
used at any of the four Aspen mountains. Revenues from the joint ticket were divid-
ed through coupons used to measure actual use at the four mountains. After a one-
                                                 
1  See SCHOMMER, pp.124-126. 
2  See Commission Decision 94/119/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 055) 52 (concerning a refusal to grant 
access to the facilities of the Port of Rødby [Denmark]). 
3  See also Commission Decision 94/19/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 015) 8 (relating to a proceeding pur-
suant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty [IV/34.689- Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink-Interim 
Measures]). 
4  Example based on the case of Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 
1509 (10th Cir. 1984); in this case the Supreme Court referred to the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine, but did not decide the case on that basis, see SULLIVAN/HOVENKAMP p. 703; see 
further MORGAN, p. 644-647; HOLMES, p. 407 and LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1207 and SCHOMMER, p. 
19. 
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year discontinuance of the joint ticket during 1972-73, the joint ticket was reinstitut-
ed in 1973-74 through 1976-77. However, profits were divided on the basis of sur-
veys of actual use. Company B received 17% of the net revenues from the sale of 
four-area tickets during 1973-74, 18% in 1974-75, 16% in 1975-76, and 13% in 
1976-77. Company A offered to continue the joint ticket for 1977-78, if Company B 
would accept a 13% fixed percentage of the revenues. Company B objected to this 
percentage because it was based on the survey for 1976-77, which Company B con-
tended was a ski-season market by below average amounts of snowfall and an unu-
sually low number of skiers visiting the Aspen area. Company B wanted revenues to 
be divided on the basis of actual usage, it eventually accepted a «fixed 15% of reve-
nues for 1977-78». Company A offered to continue the joint ticket for 1978-79, if the 
other Company would accept only 12 % of revenues. Company B again urged a re-
turn to a system of sharing revenues on the basis of actual usage. Based on these 
facts the parties were unable to agree and no joint tickets were offered thereafter. 
Company B sues against Company A alleging that Company A is violating Secs. 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act5, by monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and conspir-
ing to monopolize the sale of downhill skiing services, and by conspiring to restrain 
trade (Case of Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 
[10th Cir. 1984])6. 
b. Attempt of a possible definition 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine7 has been articulated as a subset of the so-called 
―refusal to deal‖ cases which place limitations on a monopolist‘s ability to exclude 
actual or potential rivals from competing with it.8 The doctrine is a long-standing 
limitation on the general rule that a firm has no obligation to deal with its competi-
tors.9 ―A monopolist has no general duty to share his essential facility, although there 
                                                 
5  See for the relevant articles Appendix A. 
6  See literature in Fn. 4. 
7  There is a lot of periodical literature about the the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine, see for ex-
ample: BAVASSO, pp. 63-106; DEREK, pp. 438-452, CRAIG/DE BÚRCA, pp.1026-1028. 
8  See further: WHISH, pp. 690-699; Van Bael /Bellis, pp. 954-955 and pp. 1229-1232, 1235-
1237; ZÄCH, pp. 322-325; AMGWERD, pp. 226-230 and HOHMANN, pp. 23-25; RIT-
TER/BRAUN, pp. 477-481; MÖSCHEL, pp. 579-581 and SCHOMMER, p. 1-3. 
9  See BSK BUCHER, Vorbe. Art. 1 OR, Rz. 6.: ―Niemand ist verpflichtet, einen bestimmten 
Vertrag zu schliessen; dieser selbstverständliche, in den Gesetzen kaum je ausdrücklich sta-
tuierte Grundsatz ist Ausfluss der Regelung, dass ein Vertrag allein durch (frei gebildeten) 
Vertragswillen der Parteien zustande kommt.― 
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are certain circumstances in which he must do so.‖10 In other words and stated most 
generally we can say what follows: The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine imposes liabil-
ity when one firm, which controls an essential facility (such as an airport, railway, 
gas, telecommunication or water pipeline), denies a second firm reasonable access to 
a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the 
first.11 The doctrine arises, when a monopolist controls a facility or a resource, that 
serves a market, where the facility or resource is «essential» in the sense that com-
petitors must have access to it if they are to be meaningfully able to compete with the 
monopolist in the downstream market in which the dominant firm holds monopoly 
power.12 
c. USA 
In the US the Supreme Court cases and numerous decisions by lower courts make 
clear that the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine renders a unilateral refusal to deal subject 
to potential liability as a monopolization violation of the Sherman Act (§ 1 and 2)13. 
Consequently, the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine is not an independent cause of action, 
but rather a type of monopolization claim.14 
However, to define Essential-Facilities-Doctrine, with all its implications in 
terms of competition and related to regulatory policy,15 is a pretty difficult task. As a 
matter of fact, a «simple» definition will hardly ever satisfy. Nevertheless the follow-
ing definition should be a useful starting point: ―The expression essential facility is 
used to describe a facility or infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers 
and/or enabling competitors to carry on their business, and which cannot be replicat-
ed by any reasonable means.‖16 
                                                 
10   Carribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
11  See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991). 
12  See HOLMES, p. 404. 
13  See WEBER/DÖRR, p. 78 and SCHOMMER, pp. 14-28; see for the relevant articles Appendix A. 
14  See Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found, 890 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y 1995). 
15  See also Part C. (FRAND). 
16  Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommuni-
cations sector, Official Journal of the European Communities,  98/C 265/02, para. 68 (Ac-
cess Notice). 
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d. EC and Switzerland 
Other than in the USA17 there is a reason why the issue of the access for essential 
facilities in the EC became relevant. The Commission and many member states de-
veloped from the 1980s on policies, which favoured demonopolisation and liberali-
sation of sectors, which had been considered as natural monopolies or simply not 
appropriate for the market mechanism (gas, telecommunication, energy, water 
etc.).18 In these circumstances competition is slow to emerge where the service pro-
vider can compete only if they would have access to the essential facilities such as 
for example gas-pipelines, which are owned by dominant undertakings. In cases of 
such important infrastructures it is often referred to the «bottleneck»19 problem.20 
Competition is impossible where one firm, or a combination of firms, can prevent 
others from operating on the market by denying access to a facility which is essential 
and cannot be duplicated.21 This problem was handled in many states by the estab-
lishment of specific regulatory regimes. In Switzerland there is for example a law 
related to telecommunication (FMG) that laid down by law reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms for the access to the telephone sector (Article 11 FMG).22 
e. Different Competition Policies 
If we examine the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the US23, EC24 and Switzerland we 
will have to keep in mind that the competition policies25 in these three regions dif-
fer.26 
                                                 
17  For Switzerland see AMGWERD p. 3-26; for the EC see WHISH, p. 692. 
18  See WHISH, p. 691 and 692; AMGWERD p. 239-254. 
19  See also WEBER/DÖRR, p. 68. 
20  See also Part B.I.1./3. and literature in Fn. 215. 
21  WHISH, p. 692. 
22  See B.III.2. (Switzerland). 
23  See also HOLZMÜLLER for the US, p. 230-231: „In einer Reihe von Entscheidungen die neue 
Linie [Effizienz-Standard] deutlich, nach der die Abschottung von Märkten und die Behinde-
rung des Wettbewerbsprozesses nicht als Antitrust-Verstösse gewertet wurden, wenn nicht 
zugleich im Rahmen der rule of reason langfristige preissteigernde Effekte nachgewiesen 
werden. Nur wenn der einzige ökonomische Sinn in den wettbewerbsbeschränkenden und 
marktabschottenden Effekten besteht und sich preiserhöhende Effekte nachweisen lassen, 
verstösst ein einseitiges Verhalten gegen das Antitrust-Recht.― 
24  See also HOLZMÜLLER for the EC, p. 249-250: „Dabei folgen die europäischen Gerichte und 
die Kommission – ungeachtet der Debatte um einen eher auswirkungsbezogenen Ansatz – 
einem dynamisch orientierten Wettbewerbskonzept, das ein Recht aller Marktteilnehmer auf 
freien Zugang zum Leistungswettbewerb auf allen Märkten beinhaltet und den Wettbewerb 
als Prozess schützt.―; See also Court of First Instance, Decision of 17. December 2007, T-
201/04, Slg. 2007, II-3601, Tz.664 – Microsoft v. Commission: „ (…) last it must be borne 
in mind, that it is settled case law that Article 102 TFEU covers not only practices which 
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“Especially with focus on the misuse of market power which is the key 
element to examine regarding the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine, it 
shall not be overlooked that Article 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 
102 (ex-Article 86) TFEU do not go together synchronic. The Europe-
an Commission lays a certain weight on social-, political- and eco-
nomic aspects, whereas the in the US single economic efficiency 
thoughts matter. The central role of «market integration»27 as well as 
the thought of « fairness» plays in the US no or at least not a prior 
role. In the US social welfare28 and efficiency29 policies are related to 
Article 2 of the Sherman Act as the main issue.”30 
 
This issue of the different competition policies31 we would also come across espe-
cially by the so called «more economic approach»32. 
 
In Part B we will feel the pulse of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine by examining the 
leading cases. We will see for example, that the doctrine is applied cautiously and 
usually in exceptional circumstances that meet the special requirements.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
may prejudice consumers directly but also those which indirectly prejudice them by impair-
ing an effective competitive structure (…). In this case Microsoft impaired the competitive 
structure.‖ 
25  In German: «Wettbewerbspolitische Leitbilder» 
26  See SCHINDER, p. 3 and WEBER/DÖRR, p. 77. 
27  See ENCHELMAIER, p. 3-15; see also BREITENMOSER, ch. 4, 5 and 6; BREITEMOSER, p. 26-27; 
ZÄCH Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 55-56; HERDEGEN, p. 42-60. 
28  See for consumer welfare BORK, p. 81-82. 
29  See BORK, pp. 192-195 and 435-439. 
30  WEBER/DÖRR, p. 77 (translated by the author). 
31  See for further details HÜSCHELRATH, p. 11. and RODGER/MACCULLOCH, p. 20-21 (US), p. 
22-23 (EC) and p. 24-34 (Development of UK Competition law). 
32  See Part A.I.2.b. 
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2. The Essential-Facility-Doctrine and its issues to be resolved 
 
In the following subsections there are some selected issues which create controversy 
(what exactly constitutes an essential facility? When does access has to be given and 
to whom?)33. I do not discuss these issues in a full manner. I just want to give some 
thoughts to think about. 
a.  Remove the incentive to invest in the establishment of an essential-facility 
In the case of Oscar Bronner34 Advocate General JACOBS pointed out in paragraph 
56 ―that allowing competitors do demand access to the essential facilities of domi-
nant firms, which might seem to be pro-competitive by enabling claimants to enter 
the market in the short term, might ultimately be anti-competitive, if the consequence 
would be to discourage the necessary investment for the creation of the facility in the 
first place.‖35 At paragraph 57 JACOBS said furthermore, that in the long term, it is 
generally pro-competitive to allow undertakings to retain its facilities for their own 
use, since granting access to a third party may remove the reasons to invest in the 
general establishment of the facilities.36 
b. More economic approach versus the traditional system of competition law 
The «more economic approach»37 is especially in Switzerland38 a highly and inten-
sive discussed issue.39  This new theory reflects current economic thinking about 
                                                 
33  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 482-518. 
34  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH 
(1998); see also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on 28 May 1998, Case C-
7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH. 
35  WISH, p. 692. 
36  See WISH, p. 692 and JONES/SUFRIN, p. 487-488. 
37  See in general for the more economic approach in the EC: SCHMIDTCHEN, p. 9: „Seit etwa 
1999 stösst man in wettbewerbspolitischen Stellungnahmen der EU-Kommission immer häu-
figer auf eine Formel, die man vorher nicht kannte: «a more econmic approach».― 
38  See ZÄCH/KÜNZLER, p. 285-296 (ZÄCH/KÜNZLER legen im Kontext der Problemstellung des 
„more economic approach― [S. 285 ff. ] dar, dass die Aufgabe des Wettbewerbsrechts nach 
dem neuen Theorienansatz nicht mehr darin bestehe, „im Sinne einer Rahmenordnung ge-
wisse Spielregeln zu formulieren und dabei Verfahrensgerechtigkeit bzw. Gerechtigkeit des 
Spielverlaufs sicherzustellen―, sondern dass auf die Ergebnisgerechtigkeit abgestellt wird 
(Wohlfahrtsauswirkung). Nach traditioneller Auffassung soll wirtschaftlicher Wohlstand je-
doch nicht primäres und direktes Ziel sein, sondern indirekt über die Handlungsfreiheit der 
wirtschaftlichen Akteure angesteuert werden.); Künzler, Effizienz, p. 32-68; KÜNZLER, Re-
gelungsrahmen, AJP, p. 1074-1084. 
39  HEINEMANN, more economic approach, p. 949 ss. 
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competition, incentives and efficiency. It is argued, that it is time for antitrust policy 
to move beyond structural understandings of competition (preserving competition) 
and into the realm of explicit welfare analysis.40 
The following two examples will show the differences between the two sys-
tems: (1) Beer X is in Zurich very famous; that is why every so called in-bar wants 
to provide Beer X to make big money. Now, corporation A which produces Beer X 
does not deliver one special bar B in Zurich. According to the traditional conception 
of competition law Bar B is protected, because the corporation A might for example 
have abused its dominant position. In the spotlight of the «more economic approach» 
bar B in Zurich would hardly be protected by competition law, because the consum-
ers can get the beer X in every other bar in Zurich. (2) If there is simply no further 
capacity or space for a third party (which would generate competition), there might 
be a higher chance for a duty to increase capacity in order to create access under the 
traditional system. The traditional system protects every new competitor; where as 
the concept of a more economic approach is based on efficiency and on the primary 
goal of consumer welfare, which would hardy lead to an increase of capacity. 
 Behind this background one statement of Advocate General JACOBS in the 
case of Bronner is pretty interesting. In paragraph 58 Jacobs stressed the importance 
of the fact that the primary purpose of Article 102 TFEU is to prevent distortions of 
competition, and not to protect the position of particular competitors.41 Recently the 
Commission published a guidance on the Commission‘s enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 102 TFEU related to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings.42 On behalf of price based exclusionary conduct the Commission now 
will apply the «as efficient competitor test»,43 under which it will intervene except 
evidence obviously suggests that an «as efficient competitor» can in concreto com-
pete with the dominant firm‘s pricing policy.44 On the other hand, ―the guidance pa-
                                                 
40  See KIRCHNER, p. 7-26 and VAN DEN BERGH, p. 27-36.  
41  See WHISH, p. 693. 
42  Guidance on the Commission‘s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Trea-
ty (now Article 102 TFEU) to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ C 
45/7, 24.2.2009. 
43  KLOUB, C (Price based exclusionary conduct). 
44  See KLOUB, C (Price based exclusionary conduct); see also § 22 of the guidance paper on 
application of Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU) (Fn. 31). 
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per also recognizes that from a dynamic efficiency point of view a foreclosure of 
even a less efficient competitor may in certain circumstances merit intervention‖.45 
c. Appropriate price for access to an essential facility 
To achieve an access to an essential facility is obviously the first step to take. The 
next step is the question, how much does the new competitor has to pay for the ac-
cess? What is the appropriate price for access?46 It can not be the case that once an 
access for an essential facility is legally possible because of a court decision, but the 
plaintiff can not afford the high price for the access. Here the FRAND-Principle 
might matter (see Part C). Related to the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine and the obliga-
tion to supply competitors RIDYARD47 stresses that access to a facility should not be 
required only where competition in the downstream market has seriously broken 
down. The concept of an essential facility should be very narrowly defined. There 
are however difficult problems of access pricing to be faced, so that competition au-
thorities may as a result of the doctrine end up as price regulators.48 
d. Refusal to license intellectual property rights and refusal to supply infor-
mation needed for interoperability 
A controversy legal question has been whether the law of refusal to supply can be 
applied to owners of intellectual property rights or to proprietary information which 
refuses to grant licence or to make the information available to a third party.49 These 
issues were dealt in the case of IBM50 in 1980 and in the famous case of Microsoft51 
in 2004.52 
                                                 
45  See KLOUB, C (Price based exclusionary conduct); see also § 23 of the guidance paper on 
application of Article 82 EC (now Article 102 TFEU), (Fn. 31). 
46  See Part C.I.1. (FRAND). 
47  See RIDYARD, p. 438, 447-8, 450 and 451. 
48  JONES/SUFRIN p. 484. 
49  See SCHOMMER, pp. 144-164. 
50  See IBM (1984) OJ L118/24; (1984) 2 CMLR 342 … 644 and IBM Settlement (1991) OJ 
L122/42 … 769. 
51  Case T-271/06, Microsoft Corporation v Commission of the European Communities; see 
also TURNEY, p. 179; see also T-201/04, 17. September 2007, Microsoft v. Commission; re-
lated to the mandatory access see LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1226-1247. 
52  See for further information related intellectual property rights and competition law: HEINE-
MANN, p. 33-46 (HEINEMANN fokusiert in seinem Aufsatz die Schnittstellen von Immaterial-
güter- und Kartellrecht. Obwohl beide Rechtsgebiete das gleiche Ziel der Innovationsförde-
rung anstreben, kann es angesichts der Komplementarität der Rechtsgebiete zu Friktionen 
kommen [z.B. zu weit gefasste Ausschliesslichkeitsrechte, welche dann doch noch einer kar-
tellrechtlichen Kontrolle unterliegen]. Solche Spannungen sollten nach HEINEMANN nur 
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e. Justified reasons for denying the access for an essential facility? 
Under both cases Bronner53 and IMS54, denying access to an essential facility does 
not violate Article 102 TFEU, if there is an objective justification.55 ―Obvious justi-
fication would be that the undertaking seeking access is not creditworthy or that it is 
technically incapable of using the facility in a proper manner. A particular issue that 
arises in the case of essential facilities is that there may be capacity constraints which 
make it impossible for the access to be provided.‖56 What the acceptable reasons are 
for a denial of access is controversial (an auction may be a solution).57 
However, TEMPLE LANG 58 says that there may be justifications for denying 
access to essential facilities. Though the basic principle is that if a reasonable owner 
of the facility who had no interest in any downstream operation would have a signif-
icant interest, acting logically, for refusing access, the vertically integrated company 
is entitled to do so. Consequently, according to TEMPLE LANG, an owner of an essen-
tial facility may refuse access, if, e.g. giving access would reduce the efficiency of 
the downstream users of licences – including ultimate users. Furthermore we can 
take the following two observations with us:59  
 
1.  In Community law there is a broad general principle that compa-
nies in dominant positions must not refuse to supply their goods or 
services if refusal to supply would have a significant effect on compe-
tition. This principle applies to both customers and competitors. 
Though neither the scope or the exceptions to this principle have yet 
been fully clarified, it initially made it unnecessary to develop a spe-
cial category for essential facilities cases. 
2.  Key questions in determining whether there is a duty to give ac-
cess to facilities in single firm refusal cases therefore are:  
                                                                                                                                          
durch gegenseitige Rücksichtsnahme minimiert und nicht durch Vorrangsregeln nach Art. 3 
Abs. 2 KG eliminiert werden.); see also WHICH, p. 786-792. 
53  See Part B.II.3. 
54  See Part B.II.4. 
55  See WHISH, p. 697 and MESTMÄCKER/ SCHWEITZER, p. 453; JONES/SUFRIN p. 510. 
56  WHISH, p. 697. 
57  See MESTMÄCKER/ SCHWEITZER, p. 453. 
58  TEMPLE LANG, p. 235, 272-273; see also TEMPLE LANG /O‘DONOGHUE, p. 83, 159-162 and 
JONES/SUFRIN p. 510-511. 
59  See TEMPLE LANG, p. 272-273. 
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 Is the facility created or established jointly by competitors, or 
unilaterally by a single dominant enterprise?  
 Is the facility one with unlimited capacity or, if not, has it un-
used or spare capacity?  
 How many competitors, if any, are there in the downstream 
market, in addition to the company associated with the domi-
nant owner of the essential facility?  
 Does competition in the downstream market significantly af-
fect the price paid or the value for money obtained by the buyer 
in the downstream market?  
 What legitimate business justification is suggested for the re-
fusal to supply?  
 
Further to that in the Microsoft decision60 the Commission rejected Microsoft‘s ar-
gument, that its refusal to supply interface information was justified by the need to 
protect innovation.61 
                                                 
60  See Microsoft, Commission Decision, 24 March 2004, COMP/C-3/37.792. 
61  See Part B; JONES/SUFRIN, p. 511 and 513-514. 
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Part B.  The leading cases in the USA, EC and Switzerland 
I. USA  
1. Introduction 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine was developed in American Antitrust-Law.62 The 
date of birth of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine is considered to be in the year 1912 
in which the case of United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis63 
was decided. Even though, in this case the specific term «Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine» was not used.64  The first explicit reference to the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine was made by NEALE65 in 1970 and later by SULLIVAN66 in 1977. 
NEALE coined the term «bottleneck-situation» by saying: ―Sometimes it hap-
pens that one group alone has sufficient command over some essential commodity or 
facility in its industry or trade to be able to impede new entrants. These are so called 
«bottleneck» situations.‖67 
SULLIVAN summarizes as follows: We can generalize by saying that if a 
group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if due to a 
natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is not feasible for excluded 
competitors to duplicate the facility; the competitors operating the facility must give 
access to the excluded competitors on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.68 
Further to that, Sullivan says that there must be a limiting case for this rationale.69 To 
allow competitors to enter the facility after the success is achieved is to allow them 
to share in that success without having put up any stake (the competitors took for 
example no investment risk in this enterprise).70 For SULLIVAN an answer to this 
problem might be, ―to allow any firm to have access where the need for access to 
                                                 
62  See WHISH, p. 691; JONES/SUFRIN, p. 476 and 514-518 and SCHOMMER, pp. 14-29. 
63  224 US 383 (1912). 
64  See LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1195: ―The phrase «essential facility» does not appear in any reported 
judicial decision until 1977. A few early cases, however, provide the foundation for the es-
sential facilities doctrine and explain its evolution [e.g. the case of Termial Railraod].‖. 
65  NEALE, p. 66-70 («Bottleneck» agreements which deny scarce facilities to competitors: As-
sociated Press). 
66  SULLIVAN, p. 125-127 and 131-132. 
67  NEALE, p. 61. 
68  SULLIVAN, p. 131.; related to non-discriminatory terms see also Part C. (FRAND). 
69  See SULLIVAN, p. 132. 
70  See SULLIVAN, p. 132. 
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compete successfully is shown, but to allow the original investors an adequate return 
upon their earlier investment, predicated upon the risk elements which it involved.‖71 
AREEDA states clearly and critically that the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine ―is 
less a doctrine than an epithet, indicating some exception to the right to keep one's 
creations to oneself, but not telling us what those exceptions are.‖ Further to that 
AREEDA says: ―As with most instances of judging by catch-phrase, the law evolves 
in three stages: (1) An extreme case arises to which a court responds.  (2) The lan-
guage of that response is then applied – often mechanically, sometimes cleverly – to 
expand the application.  With too few judges experienced enough with the subject to 
resist, the doctrine expands to the limits of its language, with little regard to policy.  
(3) Such expansions ultimately become ridiculous, and the process of cutting back 
begins.‖72  
Essential facilities is now probably in the expansionary second phase, which 
needs to be brought back to antitrust policy.73  With that in mind, I will review the 
cases usually relied upon, beginning with multifirm combinations.74 We will see 
later on taking a look on the cases that Areedas‘ concern is even now an issue.75 
 
In 1997 the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine was at the first time acknowledged 
by a court of appeal in the case of Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.76,77 based on the Sher-
man Act (§§ 1 and 2)78.79 However, the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine is one the Su-
preme Court has refused to accept or deny. 80  In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa81  Justice 
BREYER acknowledged that the court had never adopted the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine concept as an antitrust doctrine and in Verizon Communications v. Law 
                                                 
71  See SULLIVAN, p. 132; related to the price for access see also Part A. I.2.c. 
72  AREEDA, p. 841. 
73  AREEDA, p. 841. 
74  AREEDA, p. 841. 
75  See Part B.II.5. 
76  570 F2d982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), see also: BECKMERHAGEN, p. 51 and SULLI-
VAN/HOVENKAMP, p. 704. 
77  See Part B.I.3.; see also See LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1195: ―The term appears to be first defined in 
the published judicial opinions in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.956 (1978). 
78  See Appendix A. 
79  See HOHMANN, p. 25. 
80  See FEMI, p. 308, HOHMANN, p. 25, BECKMERHAGEN, p. 40-51. 
81  Util. Bd. 119 S.Ct 721 (1999). 
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Offices of Curits Trinko82 Justice SCALIA noted that the court had never recognised 
such a doctrine and there is no need either to recognize it or repudiate it. In the lower 
courts there are disputes about the status in proceedings.83 In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
United Airlines, Inc.84 the court regarded the case of Otter Tail85 as the only decision 
of the court relating to essential facilities; in contrast to Twin Labs v. Weider Health 
& Fintness86, both the Lorain Journal and the Aspen judgements were regarded as 
representing presence of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the court‘s jurispru-
dence.87 
2. United States versus Terminal Railroad Association (1912) 
a.  Facts of the case 
Railroad companies had entered into an agreement between themselves for the pur-
pose of acquiring railroad terminals and related facilities88 with a view to operating 
them through a jointly owned corporation.89 The geographic location of the city and 
its railway terminating points were crucial to the case: St Louis, Missouri sits on the 
western bank of the Mississippi River, at which point half of a set of 24 railways 
terminate, the other half terminating at East St Louis in Illinois, on the opposite east-
ern bank of the river.90 
 The corporation subsequently acquired control of the only three main railroad 
bridges used for crossing on both sides of the river, along with all terminal facilities 
linking the bridges on both sides of the cities. They than imposed premium charges, 
known as «arbitraries», especially on «non-member companies» of the Association 
travelling within or crossing from the St Louis side of the river, with exemptions 
                                                 
82  540 US 398, 411 (2004). 
83  See FEMI, p. 308. 
84  See 948 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 1991). 
85  See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co. 331 F. Supp. 54, 61, (D. Minn. 1971), modified in 
410 US 366 (1973). 
86  900 F.2d 566, 569 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
87  See SCHOMMER, pp. 16-19. 
88  Like e.g. ferry alliances; see SCHOMMER, p.15. 
89  See United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 US 383 (1912); see 
Syllabus in the case of United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 US 
383 (1912).: Whether the unification of terminals in a railroad center is a permissible facility 
in aid of interstate commerce, or an illegal combination in restraint thereof, depends upon the 
intent to be inferred from the extent of the control secured over the instrumentalities which 
such commerce is compelled to use, the method by which such control has been obtained, 
and the manner in which it is exercised. 
90  See United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 US 383 (1912). 
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given to traffic originating within areas in which competitive conditions existed be-
tween St Louis and the toll railway bridge at Memphis, which was roughly 285 miles 
to the south.91  
b. Legal aspects 
The government‘s case was brought under both provisions §§ 1 and 2 Sherman Act92 
– the latter in the sense of the creation of a combination with the collective power to 
impose unfair prices and conditions on consumers using their facilities. Throughout 
this decision, the court took note of the nature and origin of the properties in question. 
In this regard, the court found it easier to recognize the topography of the areas and 
the efficiency brought about by the unification of the railroad facilities; and thus did 
not regard the combination as an affront to the law as it was almost impracticable for 
the companies concerned to each have built their own bridges. Further to that the 
court also applied considerable weight to the opinion of the defendant‘s expert wit-
ness: ―The witness, however, points out that such a terminal company should be the 
agent of every company, and furthermore that its service should not be for profit or 
gain.‖93  
 Subsequently, the court queried the legality of the premium charges imposed 
on non-members travelling from and within St Louis and the provisions in the con-
tracts which stipulated that competing non-member companies might only be al-
lowed access to the ―(…) joint use of the terminal system on unanimous consent, but 
not otherwise, of the Directors‘ of the Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis‖94 
(…) and on the payment of such consideration as they determine.95 The provision 
and/or its application were deemed as discriminatory, and a threat that would put 
                                                 
91  ALESE, p. 308-309; see also HOHMANN, p. 30 and AREEDA, p. 841 and SCHOMMER, pp. 14-
15. 
92  See for the relevant articles Appendix A. 
93  See 224 U. S. 405-406. 
94  See 224 U. S. 400. 
95  See furthermore the following argument (Page 224 U. S. 400), Fn. 89: ―That these facilities 
were not to be acquired for the benefit of any railroad company which might desire a joint 
use thereof was made plain by a provision in the contract referred to which stipulated that 
other railroad companies not named therein as proprietary companies might only be admitted 
"to joint use of said terminal system on unanimous consent, but not otherwise, of the direc-
tors of the first party, and on payment of such a consideration as they may determine, and on 
signing this agreement," etc. Inasmuch as the directors of the terminal company consisted of 
one representative of each of the proprietary companies, selected by itself, it is plain that 
each of said companies had and still has a veto upon any joint use or control of terminals by 
any nonproprietary company.‖ 
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non-members at a cost disadvantage.96 The defendant‘s response that the provisions 
were not effective since they were not enforced and that non-members would be 
charged the same as members was not sufficiently persuasive for the court. It there-
fore ordered the clause to be stricken out and replaced by one providing access on 
equal terms.97 
 The court‘s analysis took in many factors that were subsequently taken for 
granted by some decisions in lower courts into substantial considerations. The perus-
al of how the economic power was unified, while giving rise to the applicability of 
the § 2 provisions, did not  result in a per se condemnation – due, in particular, to the 
efficiency generated by the joint venture. While its assessment established a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws, the remedies crafted did not threaten the recognized effi-
ciency (better coordination of transportation facilities and possible elimination of 
duplicitous costs incurred by separate management structures) by requiring that par-
ties involved returned to their previous competitive positions. Furthermore, the fa-
cility was not only regarded as the market to be assessed, it also took on the overall 
impression, as reflected by the defendant‘s expert view, that it was an industry en-
hanced product, with access difficult to argue against wherever there is room for one 
more entity to enter the market at reasonable rates and access would not obstruct the 
working of those already using the facility.98 
c. Note 
In brief, the essential facilities notion is usually traced to the Terminal Railroad 
combination case. The Terminal Railroad Association controlled passages into and 
out of St. Louis, which was an important railroad junction.  This monopoly facility 
was then acquired by a combination of some, but not all, of the railroads transiting St. 
Louis.  This combination of railroads did not create anything; it merely acquired an 
existing facility.  The combination was then in position to use the pre-existing mo-
nopoly to exclude or disadvantage competitors needing to pass through St. Louis.  
Recognizing that the combination had obtained a monopoly through joint purchase, 
the Supreme Court wisely concluded99 that the most efficient remedy was to admit 
                                                 
96  See 224 U. S. 411. 
97  ALESE, p. 309. 
98  ALESE, p. 310. 
99  Id. at  411-12. 
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non-member competitors to the consortium. 100  In addition, the Supreme Court 
obliged the Terminal Railroad Association to provide transfer to non discriminatory 
charges.101 
 
3. Hecht versus Pro Football Inc. (1977) 
a.  Facts of the case 
At the circuit court level the phrase «essential facility» makes its first appearance in 
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc102.,103 a case in which the promoter of a proposed new 
football team demanded access to RFK104 stadium in Washington.105 The case con-
cerned the unsuccessful application of the plaintiff for an American Football League 
franchise for the Washington, DC area. The claimant took the position that the grant 
of exclusive use by the public authority to its rivals for the franchise, the Washington 
Redskins, had affected the success of its application. The district court reserved a 
jury verdict in favour of the defendants for lack of explanation to the jury of the con-
stituents of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine. Therefore, the district court provided 
the legal standard as requiring that ―(…) use of the RFK stadium was essential to the 
operation of a professional football team in Washington (…) that such stadium facili-
ties could not practicably be duplicated by potential competitors (…) that another 
team could use RFK stadium in the Redskins‘ absence without interfering with the 
Redskins‘ use (…) and (…) that the [exclusive arrangement] prevented equitable 
sharing of the stadium by potential competitors‖106, before it could find liability un-
der the restraint of trade provisions.107  
                                                 
100  AREEDA, p. 841. 
101  See 224 U. S. 411: ―Such a plan of reorganisation must also provide definitely for the use of 
the terminal facilities by any other railroad […], upon just and reasonable terms and regula-
tions as will, in respect of use, character and cost of service, place very such company upon 
as nearly an equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and charges as that occupied by 
the proprietary companies.‖ 
102  570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
103  570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3069 (1978); see also See 
LIPSKY/SIDAK, pp. 1202-1205. 
104  Means the Robert F. Kennedy Stadium; see also LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1203. 
105   See DAVID B. ALBECK at: <http://www.davidalbeck.com/writings/trinko.htm>. 
106  570 F.2d at 993. 
107  HECHT , 570 F.2d at 982. 
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 ―Leaving aside the fact that a lower court had explicitly inserted a doctrine 
into general antitrust law without the court deeming it fit to grant certiorari, the re-
quirement in this case appears to rely chiefly on the criteria of examining the nature 
of a product (a stadium owned by a public authority) and the existence of capacity. 
The product was facilitated by the government – and as a result of this – where its 
efficiency could be shared without impinging on the access of those already using it, 
there would appear to be not much room for positions arguing otherwise. The matter 
itself could have been resolved by the public authority issuing guidelines or by-laws 
on the terms of access and use of the stadium. The notion of equitable sharing would 
appear to resist unreasonable demand for use by the plaintiffs. The perceived remedy 
in the court‘s instructions would appear to be self-enforcing and within the grasp of 
the public authority for implementation. The approach in Hecht could in many re-
gards be considered as relating to instances of regulatory failure in rectifying defects 
in the operation of important public facilities.‖108 
b. Legal aspects 
The court used in this case the essential facility theory as a synonym for «bottleneck 
theory», citing a 1960 treatise for the latter phrase. The plaintiff in Hecht won a new 
trial because of the trial judges failure to give the following jury instruction:  
If the jury found  
(1) that use of RFK stadium was essential to the operation of a profes-
sional football team in Washington;  
(2) that such stadium facilities could not practicably be duplicated by 
potential competitors;  
(3) that another team could use RFK stadium in the Redskins' absence 
without interfering with the Redskins' use; and  
(4) that the restrictive covenant in the lease prevented equitable shar-
ing of the stadium by potential competitors, then the jury must find the 
restrictive covenant to constitute a contract in unreasonable restraint of 
trade, in violation of Sherman Act 1 and 3.109 
                                                 
108  ALESE, p. 311-312. 
109  Hecht , 570 F.2d at 993. 
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c. Note 
Five years after Hecht, in the case of MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.1982), the elements of an essential facilities 
claim were set out in what has become their canonical form, adopted verbatim by all 
but two circuits110 over the next decade.111 
4. MCI Communications versus American Tel. Co. (1983) 
a.  Facts of the case 
Prior to 1969, the telecommunication industry was regulated as a lawful monopoly. 
Long distance service was provided by the Long Lines Department of AT& T.112 In 
1963 MCI requested permission from the Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) to construct and operate a long distance telephone system between Chicago 
and St Louis. In 1969, after lengthy administrative proceedings in which AT&T and 
the other general service carriers opposed MCI‘s application, the FCC approved 
MCI‘s proposal. In September 1971, AT&T entered into interim contracts with MCI 
defining the kind of interconnections that AT&T would provide for MCI‘s initial 
Chicago-St Louis route and establishing the price for those interconnections. 
Through a series of informal complaints and conferences with FCC staff and, MCI 
charged that AT&T was treating it unfairly, on the question of interconnections, in at 
least three respects:  
 
1.  MCI claimed that AT&T was unlawfully denying it interconnections 
for point-to-point-service to customers located outside a local distribu-
tion area, including multi-point service;  
                                                 
110  The two exceptions are the 6th Circuit, where despite use of a four-element formulation by a 
few district courts, a simpler summary (quoted from discussion in Hecht) appears to be the 
rule, e.g., Directory Sales Mgt 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir 1987): where facilities cannot practica-
bly be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to 
be shared on fair terms.; and the 8th Circuit, which has adopted a nominally three-part test 
that closely parallels the MCI four-part test: "(1) control of an essential facility by a monopo-
list; (2) the inability to practically or economically duplicate the facility; and (3) the unrea-
sonable denial of the use of the facility to a competitor when such use is economically and 
technically feasible". City of Malden, Mo. v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 160 (8th Cir. 
1989) [David B. Albeck at: <http://www.davidalbeck.com/writings/trinko.htm>]. 
111  See the case below no. 4. 
112  MCI Communications Corp. V. AT&T Co., 708 F. 2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 US. 891 (1983); see also for a summary, BECKMERHAGEN, p. 29-33. 
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2.  MCI claimed that it was being charged excessive and discriminatory 
prices for the local prices for the local distribution facilities provided by 
AT&T; and  
3.  MCI claimed that it was being harassed by AT&T employees in the 
provision of local distribution facilities through delays, improper instal-
lation, improper maintenance and other similar practices. (…).113 
 
b. Legal aspects 
As articulated by the Seventh Circuit the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine requires proof 
of the following four elements114: 
 
(1) Control by a monopolist of an essential facility or resource serving the mo-
nopolist‘s market; 
(2) a competitor‘s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential 
facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; 
(4) the feasibility of providing access to the facility. 
 
Applying this standard, the court in the MCI case affirmed findings of monopoliza-
tion in AT&T‘s refusal to grant a competing supplier of long-distance telephone ser-
vices access to local telephone facilities controlled by AT&T affiliates, where access 
was essential for effective competition within the long-distance market monopolized 
by AT&T. Also other decisions have employed similar reasoning to find actual or 
attempted monopolization of markets dominated by firms have refused to make the 
facilities available to their competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms.115 
                                                 
113  See BLUMENTHAL, pp. 856-860 (in relation with the market definition) and  SULLI-
VAN/HOVENKAMP, p. 976-983. 
114  See also WEBER/DÖRR, p. 78. 
115  See e.g., United States v. Otter Tail Power Co. 331 F. Supp. 54, 61, (D. Minn. 1971), modi-
fied in 410 US 366 (1973) and United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 
224 US 383 (1912); See further the case of Advanced Health Care Serv. v. Radford Comm. 
Hosp., 910 F2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990), in Holmes, p. 405: A supplier of hospital outpatient 
equipment sated a cause of action under the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine, where it alleged 
that a hospital that controlled over 80% of patient services within the relevant service area 
0had required outside nursing agencies that desired access to the hospital to agree to refer 
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c. Note 
The case of MCI Communications v. AT&T is still a leading case for the telecom-
munication sector. Related to § 2 Sherman Act the court stated: ―A monopolist‘s 
refusal to deal under these circumstances is governed by the so called essential facili-
ty doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful because a monopolist‘s control of an 
essential facility (sometimes called a «bottleneck») can extend monopoly power 
from one stage of production to another, and from one market to another. Thus, the 
antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to 
make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms‖.116  
 Important is the fact, that the court said, that there must be competition in the 
derived market for the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine.117 
5. Verizon versus Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko 
(2004) 
a.  Facts of the case 
Customers who received local telephone services from competing local exchange 
carriers (LEC), brought an action against the incumbent LEC alleging that it had 
breached its duty to share under the Telecommunication Act 1996 and that its failure 
to share violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.118 The Supreme Court held that the 
duties under the 1996 Act could not be enforced through a section 2 claim, but the 
Act did not affect any liability which the LEC had under general antitrust law. The 
court held in paragraph 6 that even if the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine existed it 
served no purpose here as the question of access was taken care by the 1996 Act.119 
 
                                                                                                                                          
their patients to an equipment supplier in which the hospital to agree to refer their patients to 
an equipment supplier in which the hospital was part owner.  
116  MCI Communications Corp. V. AT&T Co., 708 F. 2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 US. 891 (1983); see also WEBER/DÖRR, p. 78.. 
117  See 708 F2d 1081, MCI Communications Corporation v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, Fn. 100: ―Rather, the point made in those cases is that in the absence of 
competition between a potential seller and a putative buyer, there is no room to apply the es-
sential facilities doctrine.‖ 
118  540 US 398 (2004). 
119  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 515. 
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b. Legal aspects 
In paragraph 6 Justice SCALIA points out that the Supreme Court has never recog-
nized the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine, which has been ‗crafted by some lower 
courts‘. Given, that it could not apply here he states that there is ‗no need either to 
recognize or repudiate it here‘. However, the tenor of the judgement is not sympa-
thetic towards it. Earlier he is careful to confine the Court‘s existing refusal to deal 
precedents such as the famous Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail cases to their own 
facts.120 Even taking into account the ECJ‘s conservative approach in the case of 
Bronner121, it appears that refusals to deal and essential facilities are an area of di-
vergence between US and EC law.122 
 
Justice SCALIA: ―We conclude that Verizon's alleged insufficient as-
sistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a recognized anti-
trust claim under this Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents. This 
conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be estab-
lished law the "essential facilities" doctrine crafted by some lower 
courts, under which the Court of Appeals concluded respondent's alle-
gations might state a claim. […] We have never recognized such a 
doctrine, […], and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudi-
ate it here. It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensa-
ble requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of ac-
cess to the "essential facilities"; where access exists, the doctrine 
serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that "essential facility claims 
should ... be denied where a state or federal agency has effective pow-
er to compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms." […]. Re-
spondent believes that the existence of sharing duties under the 1996 
Act supports its case. We think the opposite: The 1996 Act's extensive 
provision for access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine 
                                                 
120  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 515 and WHISH p. 691. 
121  See Part B. II.3. 
122  JONES/SUFRIN, p. 518. 
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of forced access. To the extent respondent's "essential facilities" argu-
ment is distinct from its general §2 argument, we reject it.‖123 
c. A new element by the Supreme Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Verizon v. Trinko (2004) in effect 
added a fifth element to the for set out in MCI Communications vs. American Tel. 
Co. (1983)124: Absence of regulatory oversight from an agency (the Federal Com-
munications Commission) with power to compel access.125 
 These elements are difficult for potential plaintiffs to establish for several 
reasons. It is quite difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate that a particular facility is 
«essential» to enter into and/or competition within the relevant market. The plaintiff 
has to demonstrate that the «facility» must be something so indispensable to entry or 
competition that it would be impossible for smaller firms to compete with the market 
leader. Likewise, the plaintiff must show that compelling the dominant firm  to per-
mit others to use the facility would not interfere with the ability of the dominant firm 
to serve its own customers. 
There is no small degree of controversy about what exactly constitutes an 
«essential facility». While the doctrine has most frequently been applied to natural 
monopolies and owners of transportation facilities, it has also been applied in situa-
tions involving intellectual property.126 For example, it is possible for a court to ap-
ply the doctrine in a case where one competitor refuses to sell materials protected by 
copyright or patent to potential competitors.127 Contrary to that LIPSKY/SIDAK128 put 
a warning blinking red light to that. According to them, the the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine cannot be applied to intellectual property. ―To do so would threaten the 
basic objective of the legal systems that create incentives for the production of in-
formation, and would thus threaten technical progress.‖129 
 
                                                 
123  Justice SCALIA, sec. III, in: 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
124  See above p. 20. 
125  See also WHISH, p. 691. 
126  See SCHOMMER, p. 166. 
127  See also HAY, p. 527. 
128  See LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1220. 
129  LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1220. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
a.  The main issue 
In U.S. antitrust law, some it is argued that the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine has been 
articulated as a subset of the «refusal to deal» cases. Consequently, the doctrine 
states that owners of an «essential facility» have a duty to share it with others, a re-
fusal of which violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court does not expressly apply the doctrine, lower courts utilize the doctrine by in-
terpreting Supreme Court decisions applying Section 2 of the Sherman Act.130 
b. Elements of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine 
The basic elements of a legal claim under this doctrine under United States antitrust 
law, which a plaintiff is required to show to establish liability, are: 
1. Control of the essential facility by a monopolist; 
2. a competitor‘s inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential fa-
cility; 
3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; 
4. the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors; 
5. absence of regulatory oversight from a agency with power to compel ac-
cess.131 
d. Tendency by the courts? 
Currently the courts in the US are willing to give green lights for an access to an 
essential facility, if the competition itself is improved.132 According to SCHINDLER133, 
the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine had its entrance especially on network structure 
related to joint enterprises; today the doctrine has been applied to a wide variety of 
business contexts, namely from railroads and football stadiums to the New York 
Stock Exchange134. However, courts have declined to extend the doctrine to a pretty 
                                                 
130  See WEBER/DÖRR, p. 80. 
131  See Part B.I.5c. 
132  See WEBER/DÖRR, p. 79; AREEDA, p. 842.; HOLMES, § 3.13. 
133  See SCHINDLER, p. 5. 
134  See 373 U.S. 341 (1963) and BLUMENTHAL p. 864-865. 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine                                                                                           Salim Rizvi   
  24 
wide variety of situations, but never provided a coherent rationale for the limitations 
of the doctrine.135 Further to that, we have to keep in mind the question of the appro-
priate access price. In the case of MCI the court said, that related to the Essential-
Facilities-Doctrine there must be competition in the derived market.136 Interestingly, 
in cases before and after that, competition in the derived market was no further ele-
ment for the application of this doctrine.137 Also the FTC does not require this addi-
tional element.138 
                                                 
135  See LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1187. 
136  See remarks in Fn. 117. 
137  See Hecht/Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C.Cir. 1977) and Fishman/Estate of 
Wirtz, 807 F.2d. 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986). 
138  See General Motors Corp., 99 F.T.C. 464, 580 f. (1982); see also SCHOMMER, p. 36. 
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The first139  express reference to the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in EC law was 
made in the three harbour cases140, e.g. Sealink/B&I Holyhead141. Sealink Harbours 
was the owner and operator of the port at Hollyhead, in Wales, and as such was held 
by the Commission to be in a dominant position on the market on the British side for 
port facilities for ferry services on the «central corridor» route between Wales and 
Ireland (i.e. Holyhead to Dublin and Dun Laoghaire). It ran ferries on that route. B&I 
also ran ferries from the port. B&I used a particular berth, the Admiralty Pier, and 
the limitations of the harbour were such that whenever Sealink‘s ferries passed the 
berth, the drawing away of water and turbulences meant that B&I had to cease all 
loading and unloading activity. B&I complained that Sealink intended to introduce a 
new timetable which would cause greater disruption to B&I‘s schedules in this way. 
The Commission adopted a decision providing for interim measures, ordering 
Sealink to return to its previous timetable. However, the matter finally never went to 
a court‘s decision because the dispute was settled.142  
 In the first sentence of paragraph 41 the Commission laid down the basic 
principle that an owner of an essential facility may have to provide non-
discriminatory access to it to a competitor:  
 
A dominant undertaking which both owns or controls and itself uses an 
essential facility, i.e., a facility or infrastructure without access to which 
competitors cannot provide services to their customers, and which refus-
es its competitors access that facility or grants access to competitors only 
on terms less favourable than those which it gives its own services, 
                                                 
139  It is also possible to see that the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine manifested itself in earlier 
cases. See e.g. TEMPLE LANG, Competition, p. 437 and See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 476 (however 
not «expresis verbis»); see also WEBER/DÖRR, p. 80. 
140  The three harbour cases: Sealink/B&I Holyhead, Decision by the Commission on 11 June 
1992, CMLR 1992, 255; Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, Decision by the Commission on 21 
December 1993, Abl. 1994 L 15/8 ff.; Port of Rödby, Decision by the Commission on 21 
December 1993, Abl. 1994 L 55/52 ff.; see for the development DESELAERS, p. 563 and 
FURSE, p. 469 and SCHOMMER, pp. 111-129. 
141  See Sealink/B&I Holyhead: Interim Measures (1992) 5 CMLR 255. 
142  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 479. 
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thereby placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes 
Article 102 TFEU,  if the other conditions of that article are met (…).143 
In EC competition law, the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine is dealt with under Article 
102 TFEU.144 It is applied to exclusionary practices, such as refusals to deal, having 
the effect of abuse of a dominant position in the relevant market. 
2. Magill, 1995 
a.  Facts of the case 
Magill145 concerned copyrights in tv programs (television programme schedules) 146: 
Most homes in the Republic of Ireland and around two-fifths of Northern Irish 
homes are able to receive television programmes broadcast by the Irish State Broad-
caster (RTE), ITV and the BBC. Now, under United Kingdom and Irish copyright 
law, the BBC, ITV (acting through a subsidiary, Independent Television Publications 
Limited ["ITP"]) and RTE own the copyright in their lists of television programmes. 
These three broadcasters provided their programme schedules free of charge to daily 
and periodical newspapers but until 1985 there was no comprehensive weekly listing 
guide. In 1985 the publisher Mr. Magill decided to create a new Irish guide to all 
channels and complained to the European Commission when the three broadcasters 
refused to license him to reproduce their weekly listings. The publisher complained 
to the Commission, which ordered the broadcasters to grant the necessary licenses 
(the Commission decided that there was a breach of Article 102 TFEU). The ECJ 
upheld both the Commission's and the Court of First Instance's view that the refusal 
by television companies to permit publication of their listings was a breach of Article 
                                                 
143  The Commission cited cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commer-
cial Solvents Corp v. EC Commission (1974) ECR 223, (1974) 1 CMLR 309; see further 
JONES/SUFRIN, p. 479. 
144  The case of B&I/Sealink (CMLR 1992/2, S. 255 and Fn. 140 und 141) shows the reception 
of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the EC, because the owner of the port did nether refuse 
to have further nor starting making any business relations; see also SCHOMMER, p. 118. 
145  C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P. 
146  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 495-497. 
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102 TFEU and prevented publication of comprehensive listings for which consumer 
demand existed.147 
b. Legal aspects 
The ECJ upheld the Commission's imposition of a compulsory license on copyright 
owners to remedy a violation of Article 102 TFEU. The violation consisted of the 
exercise by television broadcasters of their exclusive rights under national copyright 
laws to prevent potential publishers of weekly television guides from copying their 
copyrighted weekly television listings. This prevented potential competitors from 
entering the market for weekly television guides in a geographic area comprised of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, a portion of the United Kingdom.148 
In Magill the ECJ affirmed that mere ownership of an IPR cannot confer a 
dominant position, as referred in the introduction above.149 However the ECJ ruled 
that in certain extreme cases a certain usage or non-usage of an IPR can be consid-
ered to be abuse of a dominant position. The abuse consisted of a monopoly on in-
formation necessary to produce weekly magazines, through the copyright associated 
to it. The proprietors of the monopoly abused their position according to Article 102 
TFEU because (1) there where no actual or potential substitutes for a comprehensive 
weekly television guide, and there was a consumer demand for one; (2) there was no 
justification for such refusal either in the activity of television broadcasting or in 
publishing television magazines; (3) the broadcasters reserved themselves to the sec-
ondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all competition on the mar-
ket. The ECJ decided that refusal to license an IPR to a party who intends to create a 
competitive product, can constitute an abuse according to Article 102 TFEU, thus 
also including IPRs in EC-competition law jurisprudence.150 
 However, the importance of Article 102 TFEU is clearly underlined by the 
Magill judgement and it is a matter of concern to holders of intellectual property 
                                                 
147  See Schommer, pp. 132-169 and FLINT, p. 1. 
148  See capsule summary in C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P. 
149  See for the impact of Magill on refusals to license, OPI, p. 453. 
150  See Case 238/87 Volvo AB v Eric Veng, paragraph 9, and Magill, paragraph 50; see also: 
VIKTOR JOHANSSON, available at: <www.juridicum.su.se>. 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine                                                                                           Salim Rizvi   
  28 
rights that a refusal to license, even though there may be no classically abusive be-
haviour such as price fixing, may infringe Article 102 TFEU. Although the ECJ has 
confirmed that the principles in Magill will apply only in exceptional circumstances, 
it is likely that the judgement will lead to further challenges to holders of intellectual 
property rights who refuse to license third parties in particular in the field of comput-
ers and telecommunications.151 Although the judgement appears to be confined to 
«exceptional circumstances» there is a problem with the judgement's lack of clarity 
and, in particular, its failure to explain in what «exceptional circumstances» it will 
apply.152  
c. Note 
Magill has given rise to controversy that the following question will show.153 Are the 
conditions in the judgment the only ones which can constitute «exceptional circum-
stances» or is this concept open-ended? What is in concreto the meaning of the 
phrase «secondary market» and can Article 102 TFEU ever require a dominant com-
pany to license IPRs to enable another company to compete with it on the market 
where it is dominant? What is the measure of «indispensability» when determining 
whether refusal to license is abusive?154 
Although the ECJ's judgment in IMS155 is not perfectly clear, it seems to result in: (i) 
The setting in the Magill test is «sufficient» to find an infringement of Article 102 
TFEU. This tends to confirm that other circumstances may also give rise to in-
fringement; consequently the Magill test is not exhaustive.156 (ii) The Magill test can 
be met even when the aspiring licensee intends to compete on the same market as the 
IPR holder. Nevertheless, the licensee must aim to introduce «new» products or ser-
vices on that market, rather than merely «duplicating» the products or services al-
ready offered by the IPR holder. Or said it in different words, refusing a license to 
prevent price competition is not abusive, whereas refusing a license with the effect of 
                                                 
151  See Part B.I.5.c. and LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1220. 
152  See SCHOMMER, p. 144 (IPR and the case of Magill); see FLINT, p. 1. 
153  See FLINT, p. 1. 
154  See also B.II.4 (case of IMS) and for the impact of refusals to license prior and after Magill, 
OPI, p. 452-463. 
155  See for the case of IMS Part B.II.4. 
156  See NORALL, p. 1; see for the Magill test Part B.II.4.b. (case of IMS Health). 
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preventing innovation is.157 (iii) Magill test requires that a denial of the licence must 
make the introduction of new products impossible. Moreover, if the denial of licence 
leads to economical non-viability for the aspiring licensee to enter the market is also 
seen as abusive. Although the term «economically viable» appears to be a delusion 
of IPRs held by dominant companies. 158 ―In view of the lack of clarity in the lan-
guage used, there is some doubt whether the ECJ (in this case consisting only of a 
three judge panel) intended the full implications of that language. Thus, it cannot be 
excluded that, when the European courts are given a further opportunity to consider 
the matter, they may seek to bring some clarification.‖159 
3. Bronner 
a.  Facts of the case 
An Austrian court referred to the ECJ under Article 234 EC (new Article 267 TFEU) 
the question whether the refusal by a newspaper group holding a substantial share of 
the market in daily newspapers to allow the publisher of a competing newspaper 
access to its home-delivery network, or to do so only if it purchased from the group 
certain additional services, constituted an abuse of a dominant position contrary to 
what was then article 86 of the Treaty (now Article 102 TFEU).160 
Oscar Bronner was the publisher of a daily newspaper whose share of the 
Austrian daily newspaper market was 3.6 per cent of circulation and around 6 per 
cent of advertising revenues. Mediaprint was the publisher of two daily newspapers 
and carried on the marketing and advertising business of those newspapers through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. The combined market share of the two newspapers was 
46.8 per cent of total circulation and 42 per cent of total advertising revenues. 
Oscar Bronner argued that under the doctrine of «essential facilities» Me-
diaprint was obliged to allow access to the home-delivery service by competing 
products and at market prices.161 
 
                                                 
157  See NORALL, p. 1. 
158  See for the case of IMS Part B.II.4. 
159  NORALL, p. 1.; see also SCHOMMER, p. 156 and 168. 
160  Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenver-
lag GmbH & Co. KG. 
161  See JONES/SUFRIN, p. 487-492. 
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b. Legal aspects 
The Court decided on 26 November 1998 that: The refusal by a press undertaking 
which holds a very large share of the daily newspaper market in a Member State and 
operates the only nationwide newspaper home-delivery scheme in that Member State 
to allow the publisher of a rival newspaper, which by reason of its small circulation 
is unable either alone or in cooperation with other publishers to set up and operate its 
own home-delivery scheme in economically reasonable conditions, to have access to 
that scheme for appropriate remuneration does not constitute the abuse of a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The Court suggested that refusal 
would constitute an abuse only if the home-delivery service was indispensable to the 
carrying on of the business of the person requesting the service.162 
The Advocate General in his opinion dated 28 May 1998 described the histo-
ry of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in US law and decisions of the European 
Commission, and referred to ECJ cases raising similar issues as follows:163  
―(56) First it is apparent that the right to choose one‘s trading partners and freely to dispose 
of one‘s property are generally recognised principles in the laws of the Member States, in some cases 
with constitutional status. Incursions on those rights require careful justification. (57) Secondly, the 
justification in terms of competition policy for interfering with a dominant undertaking‘s freedom to 
contract often requires a careful balancing of conflicting considerations. In the long term it is general-
ly pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facili-
ties which it has developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a production, 
purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competi-
tor to develop competing facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the short term it would 
be reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient 
facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits. Thus the 
mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an advantage over 
a competitor cannot justify requiring access to it. (58) Thirdly, in assessing this issue it is important 
not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of Article 86164 is to prevent distortion of compe-
tition - and in particular to safeguard the interests of consumers - rather than to protect the position of 
particular competitors. It may therefore, for example, be unsatisfactory, in a case in which a competi-
tor demands access to a raw material in order to be able to compete with the dominant undertaking on 
a downstream market in a final product, to focus solely on the latter‘s market power on the upstream 
market and conclude that its conduct in reserving to itself the downstream market is automatically an 
abuse. Such conduct will not have an adverse impact on consumers unless the dominant undertaking‘s 
final product is sufficiently insulated from competition to give it market power. (61) It is on the other 
hand clear that refusal of access may in some cases entail elimination or substantial reduction of com-
petition to the detriment of consumers in both the short and the long term. That will be so where ac-
cess to a facility is a precondition for competition on a related market for goods or services for which 
there is a limited degree of interchangeability. (62) In assessing such conflicting interests particular 
care is required where the goods or services or facilities to which access is demanded represent the 
fruit of substantial investment. That may be true in particular in relation to refusal to licence intellec-
tual property rights. Where such exclusive rights are granted for a limited period, that in itself in-
                                                 
162  See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint (1998) ECR I-7791, (1999) 
4 CMLR 112. 
163  See further: WHISH, pp. 692-694, RITTER/BRAUN, pp. 410-411 and 471-472. 
164  Now Article 102 TFEU. 
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volves a balancing of the interest in free competition with that of providing an incentive for research 
and development and for creativity. It is therefore with good reason that the Court has held that the 
refusal to license does not of itself, in the absence of other factors, constitute an abuse. (69) To accept 
Bronner‘s contention would be to lead the Community and national authorities and courts into de-
tailed regulation of the Community markets, entailing the fixing of prices and conditions for supply in 
large sectors of the economy. Intervention on that scale would not only be unworkable but would also 
be anti-competitive in the longer term and indeed would scarcely be compatible with a free market 
economy.‖165  
 
The ECJ does not use the term Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the judge-
ment.166 The court just clarified as follows: ―Therefore, even if that case-law on the 
exercise of an intellectual property right were applicable to the exercise of any prop-
erty right whatever, it would still be necessary, for the Magill judgment to be effec-
tively relied upon in order to plead the existence of an abuse within the meaning of 
Article 86 of the Treaty in a situation such as that which forms the subject-matter of 
the first question, not only that the refusal of the service comprised in home delivery 
be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the 
person requesting the service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively 
justified, but also that the service in itself be indispensable to carrying on that per-
son's business, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute in existence for 
that home-delivery scheme.‖167 
4. IMS Health 
a.  Facts of the case 
IMS168 is in the business of providing information to the pharmaceutical industry on 
sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany. For that purpose, IMS developed, in 
consultation with its customers and with doctors and pharmacies, a map of Germany 
segmented into «bricks» or geographical reporting units, and known as the «1860 
Brick Structure», which, under German law, is covered by copyright. Seeking to 
compete with IMS, another firm named NDC attempted to develop its own brick 
structure, but discovered that customers and suppliers of data insisted on using the 
1860 Brick Structure. They had participated in its elaboration, and would incur costs 
                                                 
165  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 28 May 1998. - Oscar Bronner GmbH & 
Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG - Case C-7/97 
(European Court reports 1998 Page I-07791). 
166  See remarks in Fn. 160. 
167  See remarks in Fn. 160, and in the decision Rz. 41. 
168  See IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01. 
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in using data prepared with another segmentation; as a result, NDC would have had 
to offer a product based on its own structure at a price so low as not to be viable.169 
b. Legal aspects 
NDC complained to the Commission. The Commission issued an interim decision 
ordering IMS to grant a license. IMS obtained an interlocutory order from the CFI 
suspending the Commission's decision, which the Commission then withdrew. In 
parallel, IMS sued before a German court, obtaining a preliminary injunction against 
NDC using the 1860 Brick Structure.170 Before proceeding to the merits, the German 
court made a reference to the ECJ under Article 234 of the EC Treaty (now Article 
267 TFEU), requesting guidance on the application of the Magill171 doctrine.  
 In their pleadings before the ECJ, IMS asked the court to hold that the «ex-
ceptional circumstances» test could only be satisfied if denial of the license prevent-
ed the aspiring licensee from offering a new product on a market other than that on 
which the right holder operated; in other words, that Article 102 TFEU could never 
require a right holder to license the IPRs to compete with the right holder on the 
same market. By contrast, the European Commission and the complainant asked the 
ECJ to hold that there is no requirement of two separate markets; rather, it should be 
sufficient that the IPR is an indispensable input to permit competition with the right 
holder on the market on which it carries on business. 
 The ECJ's response was very finely nuanced. First, it seems to imply that the 
Magill tests are not exhaustive. This seems to follow from the reference to both Vol-
vo v. Veng172 and Magill as sources of the «exceptional circumstances» doctrine;173 
the possible circumstances in Volvo v. Veng are quite different from those in 
Magill174. This is further confirmed by the ECJ's statement that the Magill tests are 
                                                 
169  See also SCHOMMER, pp.186-188 and JONES/SUFRIN, p. 502-510. 
170  See LG Frankfurt, AZ 2-03 O 283/00, 2-03 O 539/00, 2-03 O 628/00, 2-06 O 802/00, OLG 
Frankfurt, AZ 11 U 66/00. 
171  See Part B.II.2. 
172  Volvo v. Veng, Case 238/87 [1988] ECR 6211. 
173  See Paragraph 35, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01. 
174  The notion that there could be circumstances in which refusal to license IPRs constituted an 
abuse of a dominant position was first stated by the ECJ in Volvo v. Veng, Case 238/87 [1988] 
ECR 6211. There the ECJ noted that refusal by a car manufacturer to license design rights to 
a body parts manufacturer was not 'in itself' an abuse, but there could be an abuse if it was 
coupled with refusal to supply spare parts to repairers, excessive pricing of spare parts, or 
ceasing production of spare parts for old models. 
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«sufficient» – leaving open the possibility that there are other circumstances which 
are also sufficient. 
 Second, following the lead of the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, the 
ECJ gave a new interpretation of the meaning of the conditions in the Magill test: 
There is an abuse only where the undertaking which requested the license does not 
intend to limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered 
on the secondary market by the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new 
goods or services not offered by the owner of the right and for which there is a po-
tential consumer demand.175 Although the way in which the word «secondary» is 
used may give rise to some confusion176, the conclusion intended by the ECJ, as 
shown by the precise answer it gave to the German court's questions, seems to be the 
following:177 if the right holder has a dominant position, there is an abuse if the re-
fusal to license prevents the appearance of a new product, even on the same market 
as the one on which the right holder is operating. Apparently, where the Magill test 
is applied, refusal to license by a dominant company is abusive if it prevents innova-
tion on the market on which the right holder operates, but not if it merely prevents 
price competition on that market.  
 The German court had also asked the ECJ two questions regarding the rele-
vance of possible factual issues relating to the indispensability of access to the 1860 
                                                 
175  See paragraph 49, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01. 
176  In paragraph 45, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01, the ECJ says that 'it is determi-
native that two different stages of production may be identified and that they are intercon-
nected, the upstream product is indispensable in as much as for supply of the downstream 
product. This suggests that it equated the «upstream/downstream» distinction with the «pri-
mary/secondary» distinction. In the IMS context, that approach has the effect of ignoring the 
market on which the IPR holder is operating, if that market is separate from the IPR. 
177  Thus, in para 52 IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01., the ECJ concludes: (…) the 
refusal by an undertaking which holds a dominant position and is the owner of an intellectual 
property right over a brick structure which is indispensable for the presentation of data on 
regional sales of pharmaceutical products in a Member State, to grant a license to use that 
structure to another undertaking which also wishes to supply such data in the same Member 
State, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC (now 
Article 102 TFEU) where the following conditions are fulfilled:  
 the undertaking which requested the license intends to offer, on the market for the sup-
ply of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the copyright owner 
and for which there is a potential consumer demand;  
 the refusal is not justified by objective considerations; 
 the refusal is such as to reserve to the copyright owner the market for the supply of data 
on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned by eliminating all 
competition on that market.  
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Brick structure to permit NDC to compete. NDC argued that participation by cus-
tomers in elaborating the 1860 Brick Structure had made them dependent on it, and 
that users' switching costs to a new segmentation system would be so high as to ren-
der the use of that system by a competitor economically unviable. The ECJ con-
firmed that these were relevant issues. It cited Bronner178 as supporting the proposi-
tion that it must be «impossible or at least unreasonably difficult» for the competitor 
to compete without access to the relevant IPR, and that operation without such ac-
cess must be economically viable for production on a scale comparable to that of the 
undertaking which controls the existing product or service179.180 
c. Note - Further legal aspects 
The judgment is important because: 
 It appears to provide a novel solution to some ambiguities in the case law un-
der Magill: The Magill test is not exhaustive, and when it is applied, it ren-
ders abusive refusal to license a company wishing to compete on the same 
market as that of the IPR holder, provided that the competitor intends to in-
troduce a «new» product and would be effectively prevented from doing so in 
absence of a license. This would appear to increase the exposure of right 
holders to attack from competitors seeking licenses to compete with them on 
their own markets, and from competition authorities acting in support of such 
competitors. The latter will now concentrate on alleging that they intend to 
introduce innovative products – a claim which can probably be made with 
some degree of plausibility in virtually all cases.181 Moreover, the judgment 
confirms that the «exceptional circumstances» test is open-ended, and not 
limited to the conditions set forth in Magill.  
 The judgment shifts the conceptual framework within which is conducted the 
appeal against the Commission's decision of 24 March 2004 in the Microsoft 
case, and any further enforcement action which the Commission may under-
                                                 
178  See Case C-7/97 [1998] ECR I-7791. 
179  Paragraph 28, IMS Health v. NDC Health, Case C-418/01. 
180  Arguments follow NORALL, p. 1. 
181  Query whether the right holder should be permitted to justify a refusal of a license on the 
ground that the right holder has the intention to introduce the same innovation as that intend-
ed by the aspiring licensee. 
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take against Microsoft. It gives increased importance to the question whether 
Microsoft's refusal to license interface specifications has a negative impact 
on innovation, and whether Microsoft is right in insisting that its competitors 
are merely seeking to duplicate its products.182  
 The judgment provides an example of a divergence between the approaches 
of the EU and the U.S. in cases involving unilateral infringement. The U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko makes it 
clear that the courts should rarely impose upon a monopolist a duty to deal 
with its rivals.183 In that case, the Court refused to find that Verizon had an 
antitrust duty to share with its competitors in the provision of local telephone 
service access to assets (i.e., elements of Verizon's local telephone network) 
that it otherwise would not sell separately to consumers or competitors. The 
Court concluded that forced sharing of assets in these circumstances (1) may 
lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities; (2) requires antitrust courts to act as central 
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing; 
and (3) may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: Collusion. While the 
Court did not exclude the possibility that a monopolist's refusal to cooperate 
with rivals could violate the antitrust laws, it will be the rare case, indeed, in 
which these three concerns do not arise184.185 
 
 
                                                 
182  See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 
(Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft). 
183  See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 538 U.S. 905, 
123 S. Ct. 1480, 155 L. Ed. 224 and B.I.5. 
184  The Court distinguished cases involving concerted refusals to deals by horizontal competi-
tors, noting that these cases present greater anticompetitive concerns and are amenable to the 
simpler remedy of nondiscrimatory treatment. In addition, the Court noted that its holding in 
the leading case for antitrust liability based on a unilateral refusal to cooperate with a rival 
(Aspen Skiing) 'is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability. Moreover, «[t]he Court [in 
Aspen Skiing] found significance in the defendant's decision to cease participation in a coop-
erative venture. The unilateral termination of a voluntary (an thus presumably profitable) 
course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short term profits to achieve an anti-
competitive end». 
185  Arguments follow NORALL, p. 1. 
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5. Conclusion 
The recent decision on Microsoft186 case (or Intel)187, imposing remedies and indeed 
very high fines of EUR 497.2 million (Microsoft) on a computer giant, has done 
much to refocus attention on the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine. 
Again and again the European Courts will be faced with a historic dispute. In 
particular, the courts must be mindful that the intellectual property right in question 
has only been developed through the investment of vast sums into the IT-project (e.g. 
by firms like Microsoft or Intel).188 So, restrictive decisions in such high-profile cas-
es will always shock the technology industry.189 It is therefore vital that the court 
does not undermine the incentives to undertake such valuable projects. Although, e.g. 
Microsoft has a long history of exploiting its dominant position on the information 
technology, its products are traditionally of a high quality and are furthermore of-
fered at competitive prices. Consequently, it may be doubtful that, through penaliz-
ing large IT-firms, there would be many tangible consumer benefits. 
Throughout European businesses, there is as a matter of fact a widespread 
concern that a broad application of the essential facilities principle could have signif-
icant consequences. It appears that both the Commission and the ECJ are aware that 
the implications of a decision undermining the importance of intellectual property 
rights could be severe. However, the failure of the Court to establish more concrete 
principles in order to determine when a compulsory license should be granted con-
tinues to give cause for concern when investing in the development of new ideas.190 
As we now can see AREEDA191 critics from 1989 are still today right and up 
to date.   
 
                                                 
186  See remarks in Fn. 182. 
187  Case C-252/07, Intel Corporation Inc. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd.; see also, OPI, p. 490. 
188  See for the issue of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine and the Microsoft case, Harz, p. 189-
191 and 200 (Microsoft‘s Market Dominance).  
189  See e.g. Part B.I.5.c. and LIPSKY/SIDAK, p. 1220. 
190  HARZ points out what follows, S. 189/190: ―Though constrained by similar doctrinal difficul-
ties in both jurisdictions, the European Union may relay more heavily on the essential facili-
ties doctrine than does the United States as a justification for controlling anticompetitive ac-
tions by a dominant firm or monopolist. The essential facilities doctrine is undoubtedly ap-
plicable to a broader range of conduct in the European Union than is currently the case in the 
United States.‖; see also HARZ p. 224/225 to the application of the doctrine in the US and 
EU; see also OPI, p. 414. 
191  See page Part B.I.1. 
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It [the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine] is less a doctrine than an epithet, indicating some 
exception to the right to keep one's creations to oneself, but not telling us what those 
exceptions are. As with most instances of judging by catch-phrase, the law evolves in 
three stages: (1) An extreme case arises to which a court responds.  (2) The language of 
that response is then applied – often mechanically, sometimes cleverly – to expand the 
application.  With too few judges experienced enough with the subject to resist, the 
doctrine expands to the limits of its language, with little regard to policy.  (3) Such ex-
pansions ultimately become ridiculous, and the process of cutting back begins. Essen-
tial facilities is now in the expansionary second phase, which needs to be brought back 
to antitrust policy.192 
 
WHISH193 clarifies, that an owner of an essential facility is not committing an abuse 
where the owner has an objective justification for a denial of access. Examples 
would be that the undertaking seeking access is not creditworthy or that the new 
competitor is technically incapable of using the facility in a proper manner.194 
III. Switzerland 
1. Introduction 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine as a right for access is in Swiss law not explicitly 
mentioned. However, the swiss legal doctrine subsumes the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine under Article 7 KG (Illegal behaviour by market dominating compa-
nies)195.196 In the foreground there is Article 7 Abs. 2 lit. a KG: An illegal behaviour 
is for example the denial of business relations (delivery blockade or denial of sup-
ply).197 Although, Article 7 Abs. 2 lit. a KG has to be seen in connection with Article 
7 Abs. 2 lit. b KG (discrimination of business partners related to prices or other busi-
ness conditions) and Article 7 Abs. 2 lit. c KG (enforcement of inadequate prices or 
other inadequate conditions). In addition, the enumeration in Article 7 Abs. 2 KG is 
exemplary, that is way the merits of a case related to the Essential-Facilities-
                                                 
192  See AREEDA, p. 841 and above page 14. 
193  See WHISH, p. 697. 
194  See also TURNEY, p. 201:―A Community-wide regime that establishes minimum criteria for 
the existence of intellectual property rights based on the economic and social value of the in-
novation could dispense with the need for an essential facilities doctrine altogether.‖ 
195  See for the relevant articles Appendix C. 
196  See ZÄCH, p. 322-325, GRABER, p. 229, SCHINDLER, p. 171, HÜBSCHER/RIEDER, p. 444 and 
BSK HILTY, Art. 3 Abs. 2 KG N. 33. 
197  See for the relevant articles Appendix C. 
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Doctrine is an issue of the «catch all clause» of Article 7 Abs. 1 KG. It says what 
follows: Market dominating companies are acting illegal, if they misuse their market 
power (monopoly) by preventing competition through other firms or discriminating 
the different firms. 
 For the application of Article 7 Abs. 1 KG there must be the following re-
quirements198:  
1. A market dominating company; 
2. preventing competition by competitors or discriminating other competing 
firms; 
3. through the abuse of its market dominance. 
 
The abuse by preventing competition may be legal, if it is justified by ‗legit-
imate and objective reasons‘199. Admissible are so called ‗legitimate business rea-
sons‘.200 Admissible is a behaviour, if a market dominating company in a certain 
situation is not acting differently, as a company would do, without having a market 
dominance.201 Further to that an illegal behaviour by a market dominating company 
which is preventing competition and was declared as illegal by the WEKO can still 
be declared as legal by the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat), if there are important 
public interests (see Article 31 Abs. 3 KG).202 
However, the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine is expressly mentioned by the 
WEKO and the Courts, what the following selected cases will show.203 
2. Telecom PTT (Blue Window) 
a.  Facts of the case 
The Swiss telecommunications market has been open to competition since the Swiss 
Telecommunications Act (Fernmeldegesetz) entered into force on January 1, 1998. 
                                                 
198  See ZÄCH, p. 256-258. 
199  See ZÄCH, p. 305-306 
200  See ZÄCH, p. 305-306, SCHINDLER, p. 117 and HOHMANN, p 271. 
201  See REINERT p. 98. 
202  See BGE 129 II 18 (Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels e.V. und Schweizerischer 
Buchhändler- und Verleger-Verband gegen Wettbewerbskommission und Rekurskommissi-
on für Wettbewerbsfragen [Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwerde, 2A.298/2001 / 2A.299/2001 
vom 14. August 2002]); see also PLEITNER/ FÜGLISTALLER/RUSCH, S. 27 and AM-
STUTZ/REINERT, S. 56 ff. 
203  See for an overview also JOVANOVIC, p. 44 and WEBER, E-Commerce, p. 432. 
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In the Swiss telecommunication market, even before the FMG was enforced, the 
WEKO had to examine in 1997 the behaviour of a market dominating company, 
namely the Telecom PTT (Blue Window) according to Article 7 KG. 204 PTT gave 
access to internet providers, but to less attractive prices and conditions than to its 
own internet provider Blue Window.205 
b. Legal aspects 
According to Article 4 Abs. 2 KG an enterprise is dominant in the market if the firm 
can act independently.206 The WEKO said, that the PTT is market dominating be-
cause it had through the years a monopoly by the law for telephone services and fur-
thermore it has also the network infrastructure. The WEKO pointed out that the ser-
vices provided by Telecom PTT are an «essential infrastructure» for the technical 
access between internet user and internet provider.207 
c. Note 
RENTSCH sees in this final decision of the WEKO dated 5 Mai 1997 the first case of 
the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in the revised KG,208 even if the WEKO did not use 
the term «Essential-Facilities-Doctrine» expresis verbis. 
3. BKW FMB Energie 
a.  Facts of the case 
In July 1999 the WEKO started an examination against BKW FMB Energie209, 210 
which denied the access for a competitor, an electricity company, to its infrastructure 
                                                 
204  See RPW 1997/2 p. 161. 
205  Translation by the author. 
206  Art. 4 Abs. 2 KG: Als marktbeherrschende Unternehmen gelten einzelne oder mehrere Un-
ternehmen, die auf einem Markt als Anbieter oder Nachfrager in der Lage sind, sich von an-
dern Marktteilnehmern (Mitbewerbern, Anbietern oder Nachfragern) in wesentlichem 
Umfang unabhängig zu verhalten. 
207  See RPW 1997/2 S. 161, Rz. 37 (Telecom PTT/Blue Window): ―Diese heute von der Tele-
com PTT erbrachten Grunddienste stellen die unerlässliche Infrastruktur für die technische 
Verbindung zwischen Internnet-Benutzer und Internet-Provider dar.― 
208  See RENTSCH, p. 148. 
209  BKW FMB Energy Ltd (BKW). 
210  RPW 2000/1 S. 29. 
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of distribution.211 The rival firm, the electricity company Laufenburg, wanted to de-
liver electricity to a third company, which was in the same region of BKW.212 
b. Legal aspects 
The WEKO analysed, if the denial of the transmission of electricity is a misuse ac-
cording to Article 7 KG. Evan though there was a settlement, the WEKO left the 
possible application of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine open, but  pointed out what 
follows in the sense of the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine: ―If a market dominating 
company denies access to a competitor for a reasonable price without objective rea-
sons, there is an abuse in the sense of Article 7 KG, when the access is essential.‖213 
If the facts of the case have to be subsumed under Article 7 Abs. 2 lit. a KG or the 
catch all clause of Article 7 Abs. 1 KG was not answered by the WEKO. Further to 
that the WEKO pointed out that the denial of transmission of electricity in general 
can be subsumed as well as under Article 7 Abs. 2 lit. b KG (discrimination), if a 
market dominating company offers services to some companies, but not to all of the 
competitors without objective reasons of justification.214 
c. Note 
The key impulses for the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in Swiss Competition Law 
were done by decisions related to the electricity sector.215 
 
                                                 
211  See Amgwerd, p. 235 and Bischof, p. 143. 
212  Translation by the author. 
213  Text translated by the author; In der Abschreibungsverfügung liess die WEKO die Anerken-
nung der Essential-Facilities-Doctrine explizit offen, hielt aber ganz im Sinne der Doktrin 
fest, es sei „von einem kartellrechtlich unzulässigem Missbrauch gemäss Art. 7 KG auszuge-
hen, wenn ein marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen sich ohne objektive Rechtfertigungsgrün-
de weigert, einem anderen Unternehmen gegen angemessenes Entgelt Zugang zu den eige-
nen Netzen oder anderen Infrastruktureinrichtungen zu gewähren, wenn es dem anderen Un-
ternehmen aus rechtlichen oder tatsächlichen Gründen ohne die Mitbenutzung nicht möglich 
ist, auf dem nachgelagerten Markt als Wettbewerber tätig zu werden und auf diesem Markt 
kein wirksamer Wettbewerb herrscht― (RPW 2000/1 S. 29, Rz. 25). 
214  See RPW 2000/1 S. 29. 
215  See Amgwerd, p. 236; see also WEBER/DÖRR, p. 81-82 and 212-213 and BERNI/CASANOVA, 
p. 833 ss. 
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4. Electriques Fribourgois 
a.  Facts of the case 
Electriques Fribourgoises denied Watt Suisse the transmission of electricity. 216 In 
2001 the WEKO said that this behaviour is a misuse in the sense of Article 7 KG.217 
This decision by the WEKO was upheld by the REKO/WEF and the BGer.218 In this 
leading case, the BGer mentions explicitly the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine. This 
proves the acceptance of the doctrine by the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer).219  
b. Legal aspects 
The BGer summarizes the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine for the KG as follows:  
 
6.5.1 (…) Suivant l'exemple de la théorie dite "Essential facility" élaborée 
aux Etats-Unis (BISCHOF, op. cit., p. 131 ss; SCHINDLER, op. cit., p. 3 
ss) et discutée aussi dans l'Union européenne (SCHINDLER, op. cit., p. 35 
ss), la doctrine suisse qualifie un comportement d'abusif lorsqu'une entre-
prise en position dominante dispose seule des équipements ou des installa-
tions indispensables à la fourniture d'une prestation et qu'elle refuse, sans 
raison objective, de les mettre à disposition aussi de ses concurrents. En-
core faut-il que les concurrents n'aient aucune solution de remplacement, 
si bien que le refus incriminé est de nature à exclure toute concurrence (FF 
1995 I 565 s.; BISCHOF, op. cit., p. 129 ss; BORER, op. cit., n. 12 ad art. 
7 LCart; CLERC, op. cit., n. 124 ss ad art. 7 LCart; DALLAFIOR, op. cit., 
n. 105 ss ad art. 7 LCart; HÜBSCHER/RIEDER, op. cit., p. 440 ss; 
SCHINDLER, op. cit., p. 192 s., 195; RUFFNER, op. cit., p. 841; ZÄCH, 
1998, op. cit., p. 139). D'après la doctrine, cette théorie s'applique en parti-
culier aux réseaux électriques, qui se trouvent en situation de monopole de 
fait; il est en effet pratiquement impossible de construire un réseau paral-
lèle et concurrent notamment pour des raisons financières, si bien que les 
concurrents sont obligés d'utiliser les réseaux existants. Car sinon aucune 
                                                 
216  See RPW 2001/2 S. 255; see also BISCHOF, p. 144. 
217  Translation by the author. 
218  RPW 2002/4 S. 672 und BGE 129 II 497. 
219  Amgwerd, p. 236. 
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concurrence ne serait possible (BISCHOF, op. cit., p. 141 s., 155 s., 165 s.; 
BORER, op. cit., n. 12 ad art. 7 LCart; VON BÜREN/MARBACH, op. 
cit., p. 280 s.; SCHINDLER, op. cit., p. 77, 88, 91 ss, 122; VOGEL, op. 
cit., p. 194; ZÄCH, 1999, op. cit., p. 223; le même, 2000, op. cit., p. 204 s.; 
le même, Netzstrukturen, op. cit., p. 951).220 
 
And related to the legal reasons/justifications the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) said: 
 
6.5.3 La motivation des autorités inférieures, qui est conforme à l'avis de 
la doctrine, est convaincante. La recourante veut manifestement empêcher 
Watt d'accéder au marché en question. Watt ne peut pas livrer de courant 
électrique sans utiliser le réseau de la recourante parce que - ce qui n'est du 
reste pas contesté par celle-ci - pour des raisons juridiques et économiques, 
il n'est pratiquement pas possible pour Watt de construire elle-même un 
réseau de transport parallèle. La recourante utilise sa position de fait do-
minante, qu'elle tire de son réseau de transport, pour ne pas devoir s'ouvrir 
à la concurrence. Son comportement est donc directement dirigé contre 
une possible instauration de la concurrence et exclut, dans le résultat, toute 
concurrence entre les fournisseurs d'énergie. Ce comportement doit donc 
être qualifié d'abusif, dans la mesure où il ne peut pas être justifié par des 
motifs objectifs.221 
 
In addition, the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) did not see any objective reasons of 
justification for the denial of the transmission of electricity.222 
 
                                                 
220  BGE 129 II 497 S. 539. 
221  BGE 129 II 497 S. 540. 
222  See also Amgwerd, p. 237 and JOVANOVIC, p. 46 with further information; see also SCHLAU-
RI/VLCEK, p. 146. 
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5. Swiss Football League  
a.  Facts of the case 
In a civil competition procedure the commercial court of the canton Aargau (Swit-
zerland) released a temporarily decision on 19th October 2004.223 The court stated 
that a football player who was workless abroad also beyond transfer periods must be 
admitted to play actively. 
 David Sesa was born in 1973 and is a Swiss citizen. From 1998 he played for 
the Italian football club Lecce and from 2000 for football club Napoli. However, the 
football club Napoli did not get a new licence to play for the season 2004/2005 and 
as a result of this, David Sesa‘s contract (which would have endured till 2007) was 
cancelled. On 20/21 September 2004 David Sesa signed a contract to play for one 
period in Switzerland, but the Swiss Football League did not give its approval.224 
b. Legal aspects 
Football is on a national level (Switzerland) a relevant market in which on one side 
there are several football clubs and on the other side there are football players. Nev-
ertheless, the Swiss Football League has a factual monopoly by licensing each foot-
ball player; without a licence from the Swiss Football League no player is admitted 
to play football.225 
 The commercial court of the canton Aargau based its decision on Article 7 
Abs. 1 lit. a KG and pointed out, that the licensing system of the football league is an 
«essential facility».226 The court saw no objective reasons for the denial (legitimate 
                                                 
223  See RPW 2004/4 S. 1203. 
224  Translation by the author. 
225  See HOFFET, p. 184. 
226  RPW 2004, S. 1208 (3.2.2): „Marktbeherrschende Unternehmen verhalten sich namentlich 
im Falle der Verweigerung von Geschäftsbeziehungen unzulässig oder missbräuchlich (Art. 
7 Abs. 2 Bst. a KG). Mit der Verweigerung von Geschäftsbeziehungen hindert ein marktbe-
herrschendes Unternehmen andere Marktteilnehmer mittelbar oder unmittelbar daran, in den 
von ihm beherrschten Markt einzudringen oder in diesem Markt ihre Marktstellung zu ver-
bessern. Eine solche Behinderung oder Benachteiligung liegt unter anderem immer dann vor, 
wenn das marktbeherrschende Unternehmen über "essential facilities" verfügt, die zur Er-
bringung bestimmter Dienstleistungen oder zur Herstellung bestimmter Produkte unerläss-
lich sind. Die Gesuchsgegnerin verfügt über die "essential facilities" bezüglich der Zulas-
sung von Berufsfussballspielern zum nationalen Fussballmarkt. Indem sie dem Gesuchsteller 
3 die Berufsausübung bis zum Beginn der zweiten Phase des Wettspielbetriebes der Super-
League verunmöglicht, verweigert sie ihm den entsprechenden Marktzutritt. Der Miss-
brauchstatbestand von Artikel 7 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a KG ist dadurch grundsätzlich erfüllt.― 
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and objective reasons)227. Furthermore, the court declared the associations-stautes for 
not applicable.228 
6. Pay-TV-Market  
a.  Facts of the case 
Cablecom GmbH carries as her main business in Switzerland the distribution of TV- 
and Radioprograms through her cable network. In this sector, Cabelcom was also 
dominant. Since 2002 Cablecom is also providing an own Pay-TV-Platform. In this 
downstream market (market for Pay TV) it is not Cabelcom but Teleclub AG, which 
holds a dominant position.229 Cablecom refused Teleclub to use its cable network; 
the network of Cablecom had in this matter the character of an essential facility.230 
The Weko, as the first instance, enacted a provisional decision against Cablecom.231  
b. Legal aspects 
Cablecom took the case to the next instance, the Reko.232 Also the Reko decided in 
favour of Teleclub AG. Surprisingly, the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) decided dif-
ferently.233 The Weko released a provisional decision for which the facts of the case 
and legal examination must not be very precise. The Swiss Supreme Court argued, 
the access right would be a too heavy interference, if the facts of the case are not 
seriously examined.234 Evan though Cablecom would have been able to banish Tele-
club AG from its network it did not do it, because both parties reached settlement.235 
 
Further cases236 in Switzerland which dealt with the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine:  
(i) Platform to inform customers (hospital which informed burial firms/access to this 
platform).237 
                                                 
227  See ZÄCH, p. 305-306 and Part B.III.1. 
228  See for a different opinion JOVANOVIC, p. 52-54, he points out that in this case there is no 
«self interest» and consequently there is no room for the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine. 
229  See for the case RPW 2992/4, p. 567 ss., Weko, Teleclub AG vs. Cablecom GmbH. 
230  However, the Weko did not use the term essential facility explicitly; see JOVANOVIC, p. 45. 
231  See RPW 2992/4, p. 567 ss., Weko, Teleclub AG vs. Cablecom GmbH. 
232  See RPW 2003/2, p. 406 ss., Reko, Cablecom GmbH. 
233  See RPW 2003/4, p. 912 ss., Bundesgericht, Cablecom GmbH/Teleclub AG, Wettbewerbs-
kommission, Rekurskommission für Wettbewerbsfragen. 
234  See RPW 2003/4, p. 920 s., Bundesgericht, Cablecom GmbH/Teleclub AG, Wettbewerbs-
kommission, Rekurskommission für Wettbewerbsfragen. 
235  See JOVANOVIC, p. 45 with further information. 
236  See for an overview JOVANOVIC, p. 44-54. 
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(ii) Access to parking spots (parking service near by the gate of the airport).238  
To sum up, the variety of the cases show how many-sided this doctrine is. 
7. Conclusion  
The conclusion from the above mentioned cases is that Article 7 KG contains also 
the Essential-Facilities-Cases. Especially the electricity market cases show clearly 
that access to systems related to transmission of electricity can be reached by compe-
tition law. The element of misuse in Article 7 KG was substantiated by the doctrine 
and court decisions. This result was obviously done by comparative law; related to 
that the WEKO said: For the refusal to deal cases, the Swiss legal practice leans on 
the praxis abroad [the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine].239 For that, the legal practice of 
the EC plays an important role (especially because the Swiss Competition Law is 
oriented by the EC competition law.240 
As a matter of fact, to be market dominating is according to Article 7 KG not 
in general forbidden. But as explained above, the misuse of a market dominating 
situation is forbidden. The misuse is related to elements of the Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine – the denial of access to an essential facility.241 The element of essentiality 
results from the necessity to reach a downstream market. The necessity assumes that 
there is no alternative – as well there is no possibility to duplicate the system. Im-
portant to note is the fact that the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) requires like the ECJ 
a qualified disability (exclusion of effective competition) on the downstream mar-
ket.242 The requirements in the general clause (catch all phrase) in Article 7 Abs. 1 




                                                                                                                                          
237  See RPW 2003/2, p. 451 ss., Handelsgericht des Kantons Aargau, Allgemeines Bestattungs-
institut. 
238  See RPW 2004/1, 102 ss., Wettbewerbskommission, Flughafen Zürich AG (Unique) – Valet 
Parking. 
239  See RPW 2007/ S. 353, Rz. 44.  
240  See Botschaft 1994, p. 468 ff., especially p. 471 and 528 ss. (Der Gesetzesentwurf im inter-
nationalen, insbesondere europäischen Kontext); see also Schindler, p. 34. and Weber, SIWR 
V/2,  S. 27  ff. 
241  See SCHINDLER, p. 34. 
242  BGE 129 II 49 E. 6.5.1. 
243  See Amgwerd, p. 239. 
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Article 7 Abs. 1 KG 
(catch all phrase) 
Essential-Facilities-
Doctrine 
A market dominating com-
pany 
A market dominating com-
pany 
Abuse of market dominance Abuse in the sense of the 





sion of effective competi-











In contrast to the ECJ the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) seems related to the Essen-
tial-Facilities-Doctrine to renounce the element of the «prevention of a from the con-
sumers potentially wanted product».244 With that, the scope of Article 7 KG is wider 
than the requirements by the ECJ. 
                                                 
244  See Amgwerd, p. 239. 
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Part C.  FRAND 
I. Introduction 
1. Background and Definition 
Computer or cellular phones, just to mention a few examples, must be able to com-
municate with each other. Consequently without standardisation a product or a mar-
ket may not exist in modern life, because in high-technology sectors, uniform indus-
try standards are crucial for ensuring product compatibility or interoperability.245 
Standard setting organizations usually have rules that govern the ownership 
of patent rights covering the standards they adopt. Now, one of the most general 
rules is that a patent covering the standard must be adopted on «reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms» (RAND) or «fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms» 
(FRAND).246 The two terms are generally interchangeable; FRAND seems to be 
preferred in Europe247 and RAND in the U.S.248 
 The term FRAND refers in licensing to the obligation that is often required 
by Standards Setting Organizations249 for members participating in the standard set-
ting process. These industry groups set common standards for particular industry in 
order to ensure compatibility and interoperability of devices manufactured by differ-
ent entities. Modern life depends on this interoperability of countless technical de-
vices: Electric plugs must fit into electric sockets, light bulbs must fit into lamp 
sockets, webpage materials must be readable on different computer systems, and 
cellular telephones must be able to talk to each other.250 Nevertheless, the rationale 
behind the FRAND Commitment itself can be described as follows:  
                                                 
245  See ABELL, p. 1601 and GERADIN/RATO, pp. 103: ―Industry standards ensure that products 
from multiple vendors are compatible and interoperable. A standard can be defined as a set 
of technical specifications which seeks to provide a common design for a product or process. 
The welfare benefits deriving from the existence of standards are obvious. By allowing com-
plementary or component products from different manufactures to be to be combined or used 
together, they increase consumer choice and convenience, and reduce costs.‖; see for Swit-
zerland, BSK HILTY, Art. 3 Abs. 2 KG N. 33. 
246  See for the Question «Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse?», GERADIN/RATO, 
pp. 101-161. 
247  See below the case of Qualcomm in the EC, Part C III, where the term FRAND is used. 
248  TREACY /LAWRANCE, pp. 22-29. 
249  Also called «SSOs» for Standards Setting Organizations. 
250  See CARY/WORK-DEMBOWSKI/HAYES, p. 1241. 
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(a)   ensuring dissemination251 of the essential IPR contained in a standard by allow-
ing it to remain available for adoption by members of the industry and  
(b)   to make sure that the holders of those IPR are able to reap adequate rewards 
from their innovations.252 
 
 Standards Setting Organizations include this obligation in their bylaws as a 
means of enhancing the pro-competitive character of their industry. They are intend-
ed to prevent members from engaging in licensing abuse based on the monopolistic 
advantage generated as a result of having their intellectual property rights (IPR) in-
cluded in the industry standards. Without such commitment, members could use mo-
nopoly power inherent in a standard to impose «unfair, unreasonable and discrimina-
tory licensing terms» which would understandably damage competition and inflate 
their own relative position.253 
2. The Terms 
Under FRAND owners of intellectual property rights which are essential to the 
standard typically commit254 to licence such patents on the following terms:255  
Fairness and Reasonableness: In brief, the term fair relates primarily to the under-
lying licensing terms, where as the term reasonableness refers mainly to the licensing 
rates. Several economist suggest that a reasonable royalty is the royalty that the es-
sential patent holder could have obtained before a standard was adopted – i.e. on an 
ex ante basis.256 Further to that SWANSON/BAUMOL argue as follows: ―If the primary 
goal of obtaining RAND licensing commitments is to prevent IP holders from setting 
royalties that exercise market power created by standardisation, then the concept of a 
«reasonable» royalty for purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and imple-
mented by reference to ex ante competition, e.g., competition in advance of standard 
                                                 
251  This could be for example a chip in a cellular phone to configure a connection the telephone 
network; See C.I.4. «Qualcomm» in this paper. 
252  GERADIN/RATO, p. 110. 
253  See POULTON, p. 717. 
254  See for the difference between the traditional model of bilateral negotiations for the licensing 
of standard-essential IP between potential licensor and licensee and the FRAND commit-
ments, GERADIN/RATO, pp. 108-112. 
255  See also KLOUB, 19. 
256  GERADIN/RATO, p. 113; See also Shapiro/Varian, p. 241: ―Reasonable should mean the roy-
alties that the patent holder could obtain in open, upfront competition with other technologies, 
not the royalties that the patent holder can extract once participants are effectively locked in 
to use technology covered by the patent.‖ 
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selection‖.257 We have to keep in mind, hat this position is based on the promise that 
standardisation necessarily establishes market power beyond the power conferred by 
the patent itself.258 Nevertheless, much sense makes though the approach by GERA-
DIN/RATO259:  
 
―In our view, the question of what «reasonable terms» may consist 
of goes back to the second prerogative of the patent owner, ie its 
right to be rewarded for the innovative contribution made and to ask 
the price that the market is willing to pay for its IPR (ie how valua-
ble the IPR is to others). As noted above, standardisation does not 
deprive a patent owner of this prerogative. The only material conse-
quences of making a FRAND commitment is that the IPR owner 
waives its rights to refuse to engage in good faith negotiations to li-
cense and to grant an exclusive license. The specific terms of any 
such license, however, are left to be determined by the parties to the 
negotiation.‖ 
 
In other words, fair licensing terms would consist of those terms determined through 
fair, bilateral negotiations between individual intellectual property right owner and 
standard adopter in accordance with the market conditions prevailing at the time of 
such negotiations.260 A reasonable licensing rate is though a rate charged on licenses 
which would not result in an unreasonable aggregate rate if all licensees charged a 
similar rate. Clearly aggregate rates that would significantly increase the cost to the 
industry and make the industry uncompetitive are unreasonable. It is worth noting 
that a licensor which has several different licensing packages might be tempted to 
have both reasonable and unreasonable packages. However having a reasonable 
«bundled» rate does not excuse having unreasonable licensing rates for smaller un-
bundled packages.261 
                                                 
257  SWANSON/BAUMOL, p. 5. 
258  GERADIN/RATO, p. 113. 
259  GERADIN/RATO, p. 114. 
260  See GERADIN/RATO, p. 114. 
261  If the standard setting organisation has influence to the licensing terms it should ensure their 
fairness. For example requiring licensees to buy licenses for products that they do not want 
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Non-Discriminatory: The term Non-Discriminatory relates to both, the terms and 
the rates included in the licensing agreements. As the name suggests this commit-
ment requires that licensors treat each individual licensee in a similar manner.262 
This does not mean that the rates and payment terms can not change dependent on 
the volume and creditworthiness of the licensee. However, it does mean that the un-
derlying licensing condition included in a licensing agreement must be the same re-
gardless of the licensee. This obligation is included in order to maintain a level play-
ing field with respect to existing competitors, and to ensure the potential new en-
trants are free to enter the market on the same basis.263 The most controversial issue 
in FRAND licensing is whether the «reasonable» license price should include the 
value contributed by the standard-setting organization's decision to adopt the stand-
ard. Plausibly, a technology is often more valuable after it has been widely adopted 
than when it is one alternative among many; there is a good argument that a license 
price that captures that additional value is not «reasonable» because it does not re-
flect the intrinsic value of the technology being licensed.264 
3. Legal Problems with the FRAND-Commitment 
In general, the purpose of FRAND is clear. It is namely about creating a framework 
insofar as the standard, rather than resulting in an anti-competitive aggregation of 
market power, results in a competitive outcome. ―The competitive outcome is that 
which would have prevailed prior to the adoption of the standard, and therefore an 
outcome that does not  reflect the increased market power that results from the adop-
tion of the standard, but rather the original competitive situation before that market 
power was created by locking into the standard.‖265 
                                                                                                                                          
in order to get a license for the products they do want (bundling/tying) would violate the 
FRAND commitment; See also JONES/SUFRIN, 3rd Edition, p. 65. 
262  See GERADIN/RATO, p. 114: ―Most authors consider that the «non-discriminatory» element 
of the (F)RAND promise is straightforward, requiring that IPR owners license similarly situ-
ated adopters on the same terms.‖ 
263  See GERADIN/RATO, p. 114: ―Discriminating between similarly situated competitors active in 
the markets for the product incorporating the standardised IPR would hinder the competitive 
process, as would allowing licensees to mix and match various provisions of individual li-
cence agreements that reflect trade-offs between original parties.‖ 
264  See LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, p. 675-679. 
265  CARY, p. 26. 
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 While Standards Setting Organizations may require a FRAND basis, little 
interpretation of the concept «FRAND» is provided.266 Drawing from a selected lit-
erature267 , two main alternatives for interpreting FRAND should be noted: The 
«Swanson-Baumol approach»268 and the «Shapley value approach»269.  
 
The Swanson–Baumol approach270 – the price that the IP holder would be able and 
willing to charge prior to the acceptance of the IP into the standard represents a fair 
price, as it reflects the value of the IP independently of the value of the standard.271 
 
The Shapley value approach272 – a price that awards each IP holder the value repre-
senting its contribution in a cooperative game situation.273 According to Shapley the 
payoffs are driven by the number of alternatives for each element of the technology, 
rather than the innate value that a particular technology brings to the standard. For 
example, if just one operator develops the one aspect of the technology, while two 
together the other aspect, the payoffs would be 2/3 to the first and 1/3 would be di-
vided between the last two.274 
 
Honestly, what has to be pointed out is the interpretation/reflection for the term «rea-
sonable» by SWANSON/BAUMOL275 . They articulate that an SSO participant who 
competes downstream with other adopters in the market for the standardised product 
must treat its adopter-licensees no less favourable than it treats itself. Or said it more 
simply, the SSO participant should charge licensees what it ―implicitly charges itself 
for use of the intellectual property‖276. Further to that SWANSON/BAUMOL277 suggest 
                                                 
266  See for example the critics by GERADIN, p.27: ―You may only realize later that your technol-
ogy is actually more valuable than you originally thought.‖ 
267  GERADIN/RATO, pp. 101-161 and SWANSON/BAUMOL, pp. 1-58. 
268  SWANSON/BAUMOL, pp. 1-58 (Selection of Compatibility Standards and Control of Market 
Power Related to Intellectual Property). 
269  LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, p. 671 ss. 
270  See for a brief description LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, p. 686 ss. (pp. 686-693). 
271  SWANSON/BAUMOL, pp. 1-58 (Selection of Compatibility Standards and Control of Market 
Power Related to Intellectual Property). 
272  See for a brief description LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, p. 693 ss. (pp. 693-700). 
273  LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, p. 2-35. 
274  See Oxera, February 2008. 
275  SWANSON/BAUMOL, p. 11; see also GERADIN/RATO, p. 115. 
276  SWANSON/BAUMOL, p. 11. 
277  SWANSON/BAUMOL, p. 11; see also GERADIN/RATO, p. 115. 
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a principle for determining licence fees based on the «efficient component pricing 
rule» (ECPR), which they claim is:  
 
―both necessary and sufficient for a licence fee to be competitively 
neutral in downstream markets and, therefore, at least on that basis, a 
necessary condition for that fee to be non-discriminatory. That is to 
say, many licence fees that substantially departs from ECPR level can 
be deemed to violate the RAND requirement of non-discrimination.‖ 
  
It should, however, be noted that the terms «fair» and «reasonable» cannot be de-
fined explicitly in all cases. This opens the door for different interpretations by dif-
ferent parties and my lead to legal disputes. For example in the case of Qualcomm.278 
4. FRAND, Article 102 TFEU and the Case of Qualcomm 
The European Commission has decided to open formal anti-trust proceedings against 
Qualcomm Incorporated, a US chipset manufacturer, concerning an alleged breach 
of EC Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant market position (now Article 102 
TFEU).279 Qualcomm is a holder of intellectual property rights in the CDMA and 
WCDMA280 standards for mobile telephone. The WCDMA standard forms part of 
the 3G (third generation) standard for European mobile phone technology (also re-
ferred to as "UMTS"). This follows complaints lodged with the Commission by Er-
icsson, Nokia, Texas Instruments, Broadcom, NEC and Panasonic, all mobile phone 
and/or chipsets manufacturers. The complaints allege that Qualcomm's licensing 
terms and conditions are not Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory ("FRAND") 
and, therefore, may breach EC competition rules.281 
                                                 
278  See Part C.I.4. 
279  See for this issue also Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 464: In the Rambus case, the European 
Commission seems to leave its investigation related to the commitments offered by micro-
chip designer Rambus with the consequence that there will be no case related to the issue of 
patent ambush (Antitrust: Commission market tests commitments proposed by Rambus con-
cerning memory chips, MEMO /09/273, 12.6.2009). 
280  Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA); see Jesse Meyer v. Qualcomm Inc., 
United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 08cv655 WQH 
(LSP), Part C: ―Qualcomm holds certain patents that are "essential" to Wideband Code Divi-
sion Multiple Access ("WCDMA") technology.‖ 
281  See European Commission (2007), «Antitrust: Commission Initials Formal Proceedings 
Against Qualcomm», MEMO/07389, October 1st. 
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 What was the decision of the Commission to initiate proceedings about? The 
alleged infringement concerns the terms under which Qualcomm licenses its patents 
essential to the WCDMA standard. The investigation focused on whether Qualcomm 
is dominant and whether the licensing terms and royalties imposed by Qualcomm are, 
as alleged by the complainants, not fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. In a con-
text of standardization, a finding of exploitative practices by Qualcomm in the 
WCDMA licensing market contrary to Article 102 TFEU may depend on whether 
the licensing terms imposed by Qualcomm are in breach of its FRAND commit-
ment.282 
The complaints were based on their understanding that the economic princi-
ple underlying FRAND commitments is that essential patent holders should not be 
able to exploit the extra power they have gained as a result of having technology 
based on their patent incorporated in the standard. The complaints also alleged that 
charging non-FRAND royalties could lead to final consumers paying higher handset 
prices, a slower development of the 3G standard, and all the related negative conse-
quences for economic efficiency associated with inhibited growth of the standard. In 
addition, the complainants alleged that this behaviour could negatively affect the 
standard setting process more generally as well as the adoption of the future 4G 
standard.283 
On 24 November 2009 EU-Commission announced that it closes the investi-
gation against Qualcomm.284 All complainants have now withdrawn or indicated 
their intention to withdraw their complaints, the EU executive said in a statement. 
The EU's executive said furthermore it was still concerned about how technology 
was priced after it was adopted as an industry standard but could not commit the 
time or resources to such "complex" assessments.285 
Nevertheless, CHAPPATTE asserts that antitrust intervention to enforce 
FRAND commitments is justified by «strong policies reasons», explicitly, the risk of 
                                                 
282  See also remarks in Fn. 279. 
283  See literature in Fn. 254. 
284  See European Commission (2009), « Antitrust: Commission closes formal proceedings 
against Qualcomm », MEMO/09/516, 24 November 2009: ―All complainants have now 
withdrawn or indicated their intention to withdraw their complaints, and the Commission has 
therefore to decide where best to focus its resources and priorities. In view of this, the Com-
mission does not consider it appropriate to invest further resources in this case.‖ 
285  See <http://europa.eu/press_room/index_en.htm>. 
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consumer harm absent intervention, and the need for a clear legal precedent set by 
the commission in this field (see current developments of FRAND Appendix D).286 
II. FRAND and the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine 
1. Exclusionary Power 
As we now know, a factor becomes an essential facility when there is no economi-
cally viable substitute for a competitor and consequently the owner is able to exer-
cise market power. Intellectual property bestows on its title-holder the ability to ex-
clude others from using the protected information. Accordingly, the owner of the 
intellectual property is able to exercise market power over a product requiring e.g. a 
patented technology. ―The intellectual property is very much like an essential facility 
in this sense.‖287 Further to that the main issue can be described as follows: Both, the 
essential facility and the intellectual property right confer exclusionary power on 
their possessor by virtue of the absence of economically viable close substitutes. 
 Intellectual property is a system for promoting innovation.288 By legally de-
fining the boundary of the property, it allows the owner to appropriate rents by ex-
cluding others.289 Here as well, there might be a possibility to make an invention of a 
close substitute (invent around) – this might be physically possible. However there 
are possible infringement litigation costs which must be taken into account in addi-
tion to the physical process of inventing the close substitute. These thoughts show, 
that the intellectual property covering the technology or software may be an essential 
facility.290 
                                                 
286  See CHAPPATTE, p. 331 ss.; for a different opinion see GERADIN/RATO, FRAND, p. 129 ss. 
and CHAPPATTE, Rejoinder, p. 175 ss. 
287  AOKI/SMALL, p. 14. 
288  See for the conflict between IPR and Competition Law OPI, p. 412: ―It has traditionally been 
stated that intellectual property rights (IPR‘s) and antitrust law conflict with each other. The 
conflict arises because intellectual property law creates and protects monopoly power, while 
antitrust law proscribes it.‖ 
289  See AOKI/SMALL, p. 16 and 17. 
290  See also BSK HILTY, Art. 3 Abs. 2 KG N. 33 (for Switzerland) and B.II.2./4. (case of Magill 
and IMS) 
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2.  Comparing the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine and compulsory licensing 
a. The Essence of Access Price 
In brief we have to be aware of the fact, that access to an essential facility or a com-
pulsory licensing – e.g. on the basis of FRAND – results in the great question of the 
appropriate price for the relevant access. We have to focus on this issue, because 
once an access right has to be given by the court or a law, there must be an appropri-
ate price which covers the inventers interests on one side and the interests of compet-
itors on the other side. There is no sense if litigation will go on for years debating the 
appropriate access price for providing an access. 
b. Access Price 
Does the FRAND-Principle provide any help or guidance? The answer might be yes, 
the access price for an essential facility can be based on principles underlined by 
FRAND. Related to the enforceability, a FRAND commitment may be seen as im-
posing a duty on the owner of an essential IPR to engage in licensing in good 
faith.291 
 Where difficulties arise, what the appropriate price for an access could be, the 
court might throw a glance to court cases in which there had been disputes about 
breaking patents. In those cases, patent courts evaluate all relevant factors in particu-
lar circumstances. For example, American courts give nowadays great weight to fif-
teen factors which were employed to determine a reasonable royalty in the seminal 
Georgia-Pacific case, decided in 1970 in the Southern District of New York:292  
 
1.  The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving 
or tending to prove an established royalty. 
2.  The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in 
suit. 
[…] 
These factors included, inter alia, considering license fees for similar patents as 
benchmarks, measuring the nature and scope of the patent, considering the next al-
ternative to the patent and any cost saving from using it as opposed to older modes or 
                                                 
291 See GERADIN/RATO, p. 120. 
292  See the court case: Georga-Pacific Corp. v US Phywood Champion Papers Inc., 446 F2 295 
(2nd Cir 1971). 
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devices, evaluating the opinion testimony of qualified experts, and considering the 
particular benefits to the licensee and the commercial relationship between IPR own-
er and the prospective licensees.293 Similar thoughts should be taken into account for 
an access price. 294 In literature295 there are some approaches for finding a reasonable 
charge for a licence:296 
 First, there is theory of the «Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)»297. A 
methodology that addresses access pricing taking into account the investments and 
the possible losses incurred due to the increased competition as a result of providing 
the access.298  
 Second, there is the theory of the «Forward Looking Long Run Average In-
cremental Costs (FL-LRAIC)»299, which considers the future, average and long-term 
costs which a company can foresee by making available the essential facility (e.g. oil 
price increases, rent increases, and expansion and maintenance costs).  
 Third, there is the «Hypothetical bargaining-Theory»300, which is based upon 
the hypothetical negotiations between the parties taking into account the hypothetical 
minimum charges which the licensor would accept and the hypothetical maximum 
fee a licensee would be willing to pay. 
 Forth, in some cases the best possible solution would be an auction in which 




                                                 
293  GERADIN/RATO, p. 120. 
294  LAYNE-FARRAR/PADILLA/SCHMALENSEE, A.J, p. 673 and 680-682; see also Jovanovich, p. 
240-246 and WEGMÜLLER, p. 460-468. 
295  See for a brief summary instead of a lot of authors JOVANOVICH, p. 241. 
296  See also Appedix D related to a new tendency in the EC, Rz. 284. 
297  See BUCCIROSSI, p. 287-296. 
298  See LARSON/LEHMAN, p. 71-80. 
299  See KROUSE, p. 921. 
300  See TOMLIN, p. 1-5. 
301  See Whish, p. 697: ―If there is only capacity for one additional user, it might be appropriate 
to hold an auction and to grant access to the highest bidder.‖ 
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III. Arbitration 
1.  Introduction 
Arbitration is a private system of adjudication.302 Parties who go into arbitration 
have decided to resolve their disputes outside of a judicial system.303 Consequently, 
in arbitration an independent third party considers both sides in a dispute, and makes 
a decision to resolve it.304 The arbitrator is impartial; this means he or she does not 
take sides. In most cases the arbitrator's decision is legally binding on both sides, so 
it is not possible to go to court if one party is unhappy with the decision.305 Examples 
of arbitration institutions are e.g. the ICC306 or the AAA307. 
 In comparison with a national state court, arbitration will provide some ad-
vantages: (i) Speed, (ii) Secrecy and (iii) the possibility for the parties to select the 
judges with special knowledge. 308 However, a big negative point is that arbitration is 
very expensive.309 
 
Most types of arbitration have the following in common:310  (i) Both parties must 
agree to use the process, (ii) it is private, (iii) the decision is made by a third party, 
not the people involved, (iv) the arbitrator often decides on the basis of written in-
formation, (v) if there is a hearing, it is likely to be less formal than court, (vi) the 
process is final and legally binding, (vii) there are limited grounds for challenging 
the decision. 
                                                 
302  See Berger/Kellerhals, pp. 399 ss. and 650 ss.; see also IPRG Article 176-194. 
303  For example: The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), see HEITZMANN, p. 119-139. 
304  In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506: " (…) 
an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal [is], in effect, a specialized kind of fo-
rum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in 
resolving the dispute." 
305  See in general: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement on Foreign Arbitral Award, 
New York, 1958 (New York Convention). 
306  See: http:<//www.iccwbo.org/>. 
307  See: <http://www.adr.org/index.asp>. 
308  See also MOSES, p. 3: „The benefits of international arbitration are substantial. An empirical 
study of why parties choose international arbitration to resolve disputes found that the two 
most significant reasons were (1) the neutrality of the forum (that is, being able to stay out of 
the other party‘s court) and (2) the likelihood of obtaining enforcement, by virtue of the New 
York Convention, a treaty to which over 140 countries are parties.―. 
309  See for further elements MOSES, p. 4 and 5: „Another disadvantage is that arbitrators have no 
coercive powers – that is, they do not have the power to make someone do something by be-
ing able to penalize them if they do not.―. 
310  See for a brief overview: BURGER-SCHEIDLIN, p. 3-7. 
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2.  Essential Facility Cases and Arbitration 
In recent cases, arbitrational tribunals had to impose e.g. a forced license against a 
dominant party (similar to the IMS Health case) or had to force a dominant party to 
continue sales/supplies to a competitor on a non-discriminatory basis311 or had to 
require the opening up of a network in the telecommunications‘ sector.312  
With respect to the case313 below I give an example of an arbitration case 
dealing with the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine: 
BP and E.ON notified the Commission of a proposed concentration by which 
BP and E.ON acquire the joint control of Veba Oel AG. Consequently, the market 
leaders would have a privileged position in controlling the essential infrastructure 
and in particular the pipeline links. The proposed concentration results in a collective 
dominance by Shell/DEA and BP/E.ON on the market for the supply of ethylene on 
the ARG+pipeline network. Therefore, a substantial package of commitments had to 
be negotiated, with extensive structural and equally extensive behavioural commit-
ments. The purpose of competing undertakings was to eliminate BP/Veba‘s strong 
foothold in the pipeline infrastructure. An open access to the pipeline at competitive 
costs should allow suppliers to actively compete. ―Moreover, BP/Veba‘s commit-
ment to provide access to ARG suppliers for the ethylene customers will remove the 
remaining bottleneck infrastructure which is under control of BP/Veba. In this con-
text […] reference was made to an independent arbitrator whose task would be to 
terminate the terms and conditions for the delivery of ethylene via the ARG pipe-
line.‖314 
However, arbitration tribunals will analyse the refusal to deal cases under a 
number of leading cases discussed in the US and EC or Switzerland – including the 
leading cases like e.g. Terminal Rail Road, MCI or Magill.315 
                                                 
311  See BLESSING pp. 146-150 (Case of Shell/DEA, 2001). 
312  See BLESSING p. 29. 
313  Case of BP/E.ON (2001), see also See BLESSING pp. 150-152. 
314  BLESSING p. 151/152. 
315  See BLESSING p. 214/215. 
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Part D.  Summary and Prospects 
I. Essential-Facilities-Doctrine in US, EC and Switzerland 
The leading U.S. essential facilities case is MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T.316 
The Seventh Circuit said that there are four elements necessary to establish liability 
under the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine: 
 
1)  Control of the essential facility by a monopolist 
2)  A competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility 
3)  The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor 
4)  The feasibility of providing the facility317 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Verizon v. Trinko, added a further fifth element: 
«Absence of regulatory oversight from an agency» with power to compel access.318 
 
In the EC319 a dominant company has, at least in some cases, a duty to supply, if a 
refusal will cause a significant effect on competition. When a customer is also a 
competitor of the dominant company in some market, usually downstream from the 
point at which the refusal to supply occurs, the effect on competition largely depends 
on the following three factors: 
 
1)  Whether the buyer can obtain the goods or service elsewhere 
2)  Whether there are other downstream competitors 
3)  How important the goods or services are to the buyer's business 
 
In Switzerland competition law leans on the EC competiton law.320 Consequently, 
the elements for an access do not in general differ from those in EC, but with one 
exception: In contrast to the ECJ the Swiss Supreme Court (BGer) seems related to 
the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine to renounce the element of the prevention of a 
                                                 
316  See 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). 
317  See 708 F.2d at 1132-33. 
318  See U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
319  See literature in Fn. 190. 
320  See remarks in Fn. 240. 
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product potentially wanted by the consumers.321 Therefore, the scope of Article 7 
KG is wider than the requirements by the ECJ. 
II. Prospects 
This brief note has illustrated the various approaches that have been taken to the is-
sue of when a monopolist or dominant firm can be mandated to provide access to a 
facility (Essential-Facilities-Doctrine). In my eyes the great question is always to 
what price. Here one has to find a balance between the investor‘s- and competitor‘s 
interests. 
 However, there has not been reached an (even short-term) equilibrium yet, 
between the position of a dominant firm and a possible competitor. But by taking a 
distant look, a century of antitrust litigation has produced some guidelines. One of it 
is the FRAND commitment, which obliges the parties to negotiate in good faith.322 
Further to that, the Pacific case points out some relevant criteria to achieve a con-
vincing access price for both parties. Moreover, there are some theories which pro-
vide guidelines:323 
 
1)  Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) 
2)  Forward Looking Long Run Average Incremental Costs (FL-LRAIC) 
3)  Hypothetical bargaining-Theory 
4)  Auction 
 
 By discussing the Essential-Facilities-Doctrine we always have to keep in 
mind that in general competition – not monopolization – leads to innovation, better 
products, efficiency and finally to consumer welfare. Beside this fact, multinational 
firms operating in different jurisdictions must be careful, because of the slightly dif-
ferent access-rights (Essential-Facilities-Doctrine) in different (legal) regions.324 
                                                 
321  See Amgwerd, p. 239. 
322  See C.I.2. 
323  See C.II.2.c. and especially Appendix D, Rz. 284. 
324  See e.g. for US and the element of completion in the derived market, B.I.6.d.; B.II.5 (EC) 
and B.III.7 (Switzerland). 
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Appendix A (Sherman Antitrust Act) 
 
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.  
 
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.  
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Appendix B (TFEU) 
 
Article 101 (ex Article 81 TEC) 
1.  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading condi-
tions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial us-
age, have no conection with the subject of such contracts. 
2.  Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automat-
ically void. 
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case 
of: 
—  any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
—  any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
—  any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question. 
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Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC) 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the inter-
nal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial us-
age, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
 
The Essential-Facilities-Doctrine                                                                                           Salim Rizvi   
  64 
Appendix C (Swiss Antitrust Act) 
 
Art. 7 Unlawful practices by dominant undertakings 
1 Dominant undertakings behave unlawfully if they, by abusing their position in the 
market, hinder other undertakings from starting or continuing to compete, or disad-
vantage trading partners. 
2 The following behaviour is in particular considered unlawful: 
a. any refusal to deal (e.g. refusal to supply or to purchase goods); 
b. any discrimination between trading partners in relation to prices or other 
conditions of trade; 
c. any imposition of unfair prices or other unfair conditions of trade; 
d. any under-cutting of prices or other conditions directed against a specific 
competitor; 
e. any limitation of production, supply or technical development; 
f. any conclusion of contracts on the condition that the other contracting party 
agrees to accept or deliver additional goods or services. 
 
(The Swiss Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition [Cartel Act, 
CartA] of 6 October 1995 [Status as of 1 January 2009] is available at: 
<http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c251.html>) 
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Appendix D (FRAND – Current Developments in the EC) 
 
Brussels, SEC(2010) 528/2 
Draft 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements 
 
282. The IPR policy should also require that all holders of essential IPR in technolo-
gy which may be adopted as part of a standard provide an irrevocable commitment in 
writing to license their IPR to all third parties on fair, reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory terms ("FRAND commitment"). 
283. The aim of FRAND commitments in the context of standard-setting is to ensure 
that patented technology incorporated in a standard is accessible to the users of that 
standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions. In particu-
lar, FRAND commitments are intended to prevent IPR holders from making the im-
plementation of a standard difficult by refusing to license or by requesting unfair or 
unreasonable fees (in other words excessive fees) after the industry has been locked-
in to the standard and/or charging discriminatory royalty fees. 
284. An abuse of the market power gained by virtue of IPR being included in a 
standard constitutes an infringement of Article 102. In this context and in case of a 
dispute, the assessment of whether fees imposed for patents in the standard-setting 
context are unfair or unreasonable, will be based on whether the fees bear a reasona-
ble relationship to the economic value of the patents.95 Various methods may be 
available to make this assessment. In principle, cost-based methods are not well 
adapted to this context because of the difficulty in assessing the costs attributable to 
the development of a particular patent or groups of patents. Instead , it may be possi-
ble to compare the licensing fees charged by the undertaking in question for the rele-
vant patents in a competitive environment before the industry has been locked into 
the standard (ex ante) with those charged after the industry has been locked in (ex 
post). This assumes that the comparison can be made in a consistent and reliable 
manner. 
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285. Another method of assessing the relationship of the IPR fees to the economic 
value of the patents could be to obtain an independent expert assessment of the rele-
vant IPR portfolio's objective quality and centrality to the standard at issue. It may 
also be possible to rely on previous unilateral ex ante disclosures of most restrictive 
licensing terms. This also assumes that the comparison can be made in a consistent 
and reliable manner. These guidelines do not seek to provide an exhaustive list of 
appropriate methods to assess whether the royalty fees are excessive. 
286. To ensure the effectiveness of the FRAND commitment, there should also be a 
requirement on all IPR holders who provide such a commitment to take all necessary 
measures to ensure that any undertaking to which the IPR owner transfers its IPR 
(including the right to license that IPR) is bound by that commitment. 
 
(See for further information: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_ 
horizontals/index.html>) 
